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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
by  
Milos Vulanovic 
 
Adviser: Professor Armen Hovakimian 
         This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance. In the first essay we 
test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance maturing long-term debt. 
This allows us to accomplish three goals: resolve the issues of debt capacity and the 
endogeneity of financing deficit; examine the role of internal financing; and generate 
evidence regarding the order in which different sources of financing are used. We 
determine that firms use internal funds before they issue new debt to refinance maturing 
long-term debt. Firms with more cash on hand are less likely to issue new debt to 
refinance. On average, each marginal dollar of maturing long-term debt is fully financed 
with the issuance of new debt.   
           In the second essay, we study characteristics of Specified Purpose Acquisition 
Companies (SPACs) and examine the performance of their securities over time. We find 
that SPACs represent a fairly unique way to raise capital, The incentives of their 
founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and successful business 
combinations generally result in significant returns to founders.   We also show that 
different SPAC securities generate different reactions in response to the announcement 
 iii
news regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three securities realize 
abnormal returns on the announcement day, the strongest reaction is observed among the 
investors holding warrants, while common stock holders tend to react very mildly.  
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                  Corporate Financing of Maturing Long-Term Debt    
 
 
 
 
1.       Introduction  
          Although the pecking order theory has long been one of the primary contenders to 
being the provider of the most accurate description of corporate financing behavior, 
direct empirical tests of its predictions have become a subject of intense effort only 
recently.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) (thereafter, SSM) use regressions of debt 
financing on financing deficit to test the pecking order theory on a sample of 157 large 
US public firms with continuous data covering 1971-1989 time period. Based on the 
finding that 70-80 percent of financing deficit is covered with debt issuance, they 
conclude that the pecking order theory provides good first order approximation of 
corporate financing behavior.  
           Chirinko and Singh (2000), however, argue that the regression of debt financing 
on financial deficit is unable to identify the order in which funds from various sources are 
used. Furthermore, the approach cannot properly address situations in which firms have 
to issue high percentage of equity, for example, due to limited debt capacity.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) examine the robustness of SSM findings by estimating 
SSM-style regressions on a broader sample of publicly trading firms covering a longer 
time period. They find that the proportion of debt in total financing is much lower in this 
                                                 
1 Donaldson (1961) observes that firms finance their investment opportunities in a certain order: first 
internal fund, then external debt, and external equity in the end. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide 
theoretical foundation for this financing hierarchy, known as the pecking order theory, based on existence 
of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors.   
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broader sample and that it further declines after 1990. They further find that the pecking 
order theory does especially poor job in explaining the financing behavior of small firms. 
This finding is puzzling as small firms are likely to be subject to a higher degree of 
information asymmetry and, thus, should be more likely to follow the pecking order.2 
Lemmon and Zender (2007) offer an explanation for the “puzzle” by arguing that small 
firms are unable to issue additional debt because of their limited debt capacity.3  
Leary and Roberts (2007), on the other hand, argue that the pecking order theory 
not only is unable to explain corporate financing behavior as a whole, but also fails to 
explain corporate financing choices of firms considered by the literature as good 
candidates for pecking order behavior. Specifically, the pecking order theory does not 
perform well in explaining how firms that face information asymmetry but are not 
constrained by debt capacity finance their investment opportunities.  
In this paper, we test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance 
maturing long-term debt. Our focus on the financing of maturing debt has certain 
advantages and resolves some of the issues from the previous literature. First, debt 
capacity is much less of an issue due to the fact that maturing debt frees up capacity for 
new debt issuance. Second, maturing debt is an ex-ante measure of financing needs that 
can be satisfied from internal funds as well as external debt and equity. As such, it allows 
us not only to test whether firms follow the pecking order when they choose between 
external debt and external equity, but also to contrast external financing to internal 
                                                 
2 Fama and French (2002) confirm that the pecking order theory cannot explain financing patterns of small 
growth firms. In contrast, Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2006) and Gomes and Phillips (2007) find that 
fraction of debt used to cover financing deficit increases with the extent of information asymmetry. Bharath 
et al. (2006) use market proxies of information asymmetry, whereas Gomes and Phillips (2007) use analyst 
forecast dispersion and earnings surprises as measures of information asymmetry.   
3 The idea that debt capacity can constrain a firm’s ability to borrow and lead to violations of the pecking 
order of financing is discussed in Donaldson (1961), Myers (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), but 
is not explicitly tested.   
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financing. Third, the timing and the amount of maturing of debt are exogenous with 
respect to the form of financing, which allows a cleaner interpretation of the results. 
Finally, the exogeneity of maturing debt allows us to identify the order in which firms tap 
different sources of funds by examining the relation between the amount of maturing debt 
and the form of financing used.  
Some of the previous studies consider maturing debt in their analyses. Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) include current maturity long-term debt in their financing 
deficit measure. Frank and Goyal (2003) also consider current maturity long-term debt 
but argue for its exclusion from financing deficit. Unlike these studies, however, we not 
only consider current maturity long-term debt as the only exogenous component of 
financing deficit but also include it in our measure of net debt issued. Our rationale for 
this is simple. The timing and the amount of current maturity long-term debt are 
determined by the decisions made prior to the current year. The only decision being made 
at the time of maturity is how to finance the amount due. Therefore, a decision, for 
example, to refinance 100% of the maturing debt with new debt should be considered a 
decision to issue debt just like a decision to finance it with new equity is considered an 
equity issue.  
Using a sample of public firms from 1970-2006 period, we first estimate SSM-
style regressions of debt financing on financial deficit. Overall, in our sample, more than 
forty percent of financing deficit is financed with debt issuance. Furthermore, the fraction 
of internal shortfall of funds financed with debt issuance is higher prior to 1990, but 
declines afterward. In addition, we find that the importance of debt issuance is higher for 
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larger firms and for firms with credit ratings. These results confirm the findings of earlier 
studies and provide baseline set of results to which our main results are compared.  
The introduction of current maturity long-term debt instead of financing deficit in 
SSM-style regressions significantly improves the performance of the pecking order 
model. In the overall sample, we find that each marginal dollar of maturing long-term 
debt is fully financed with new debt issuance, consistent with the pecking order 
prediction that firms prefer debt to equity issuance. Furthermore, debt issuance remains 
highly important in subsamples based on time period, size, and existence of rating. Even 
more importantly, the observed differences across subsamples are consistent with the 
predictions of the pecking order theory. In particular, the proportion of new debt used to 
refinance maturing debt is higher for smaller firms and for firms without credit ratings. 
These patterns are opposite to the patterns for financing deficit reported in the earlier 
literature.  
The pecking order theory not only predicts that firms prefer debt to equity 
issuance, but also that they would first use internal funds to pay off maturing debt and 
only after that would turn to debt. In other words, small amounts of maturing debt should 
be financed with cash. Firms should start issuing new debt only after the amount of 
maturing debt exceeds the firm’s ability to pay it off from internal funds.  
Our findings confirm these predictions. We find that an average firm finances its 
maturing debt with internal funds first. As the amount of maturing debt increases, each 
additional dollar of maturing debt becomes fully financed with new debt issuance. These 
findings are stronger for firms that are more likely to be subject to a greater degree of 
 4
information asymmetry as well as for firms with more cash on hand, consistent with the 
pecking order theory.  
Although maturing debt releases capacity for new debt issuance, cross-sectional 
variation in the incremental debt capacity induces variation in how different firms finance 
their maturing debt. Specifically, we find that the fraction of new debt used to refinance 
the marginal dollar of maturing debt declines with the extent to which the firm is close to 
its debt capacity. However, we also find that, regardless of their spare debt capacity, 
firms always prefer internal funds to external debt.  
The pecking order theory also predicts that firms would never issue equity if they 
could instead use internal funds. This implies that the results of regressions of total 
external financing on maturing debt should be similar to the results we obtained for 
regressions of debt issuance. However, this hypothesis is rejected in our data.  
These results suggest that firms may be issuing equity out of the pecking order. 
To gain additional insight into how new debt and equity issues are used to finance 
maturing debt, we examine plots of the amounts of debt and equity issued against the 
amounts of maturing debt. While we observe a distinct positive relation between the 
amount of maturing debt and the amount of new debt issued, there is no discernable 
relation between maturing debt and equity issuance. Furthermore, the vast majority of 
equity issues, both large and small, are concentrated at low levels of maturing debt, 
suggesting that equity issues are primarily used to finance other, e.g., investment, needs 
and not to refinance maturing debt. Given our focus on the latter, whether these equity 
issues violate the pecking order is beyond the scope of the current paper. Indeed, Leary 
and Roberts (2007) focus on how firms finance their investment needs and find that the 
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pecking order theory does not perform well in predicting corporate financing decisions of 
these firms.  
To summarize, we find that firms follow the pecking order of financing when they 
refinance the current maturity long-term debt. These firms first use the accumulated cash, 
then issue new long-term debt to pay off their maturing debt. External equity does not 
play a significant role in refinancing of maturing debt.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data 
and define the variables. In section 3, the regression models are explained and the main 
results are presented. Ordering tests are in section 4. Section 5 considers the effects of 
debt capacity. Section 6 summarizes our findings.  
2. Sample and variables  
We start with all firms available on Compustat for the period from 1970 to 2006. 
The coverage of flow of funds statements, which we need for our analyses, starts in 1971. 
An additional year (1970) is used as our financing variables are scaled by total assets 
from the end of the previous year.4 To take into consideration outliers and possibly 
misreported data, all scaled variables are trimmed at one percent on both tails of the 
distribution.5 We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), firms with book values of 
assets or sales less than one million dollars, and observations with missing values of 
relevant variables. In addition, since the primary focus of this study is on how firms 
refinance their maturing debt, we limit ourselves to firms with nonzero values of 
                                                 
4 Total assets is Compustat data 6. 
5 We do not trim censored variables on the censored side. 
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maturing debt.6 Our final sample consists of 113,768 firm-year observations covering 
corporate financing activity in 1971-2006.  
Several variables, such as financing deficit, play an important role in the pecking 
order tests of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Using SSM definitions and notation, the 
financing deficit is defined as follows.  
                                       DEFt = DIVt + Xt + ΔWt - Ct + Rt,                                          (1)  
where, DEFt is financing deficit, DIVt measures cash dividends, Xt denotes capital 
expenditures, ΔWt is change in net working capital, Ct is cash flow after interest and 
taxes, and Rt is the portion of outstanding long-term debt that matures during year t.  
As noted in Frank and Goyal (2003), the requirement that sources and uses of 
funds balance each other implies the following accounting cash flow identity:  
                                 DIVt + Xt + ΔWt - Ct = NEISt + NDISt.                                         (2)  
In (2), NEISt is net amount of equity issued and NDISt is net amount of long-term debt 
issued during year t.7 Taking into account (2), equation (1) can be rewritten as  
                                DEFt = NEISt + (NDISt + Rt) = NEISt + NDISRt.                         (3)  
In (3), NDISRt is net amount of long-term debt issued during year t including long-term 
debt used to refinance the portion of outstanding long-term debt that matures in year t.8
                                                 
6 Eighty percent of our sample firms have nonzero current maturity long-term debt.  
 
7 Net equity issued is defined as equity issued (data 108) minus equity repurchased (data 115). Net debt 
issued is defined as long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114). For 
observations with format code 1, long-term debt reduction data item in Compustat includes reclassification 
of long-term debt that becomes due within one year as short-term debt. We restore the consistency of the 
definition of long-term debt reduction by adding debt due in one year (data 44) to long-term debt reduction 
(data 114) when format code is 1. 
8 NDISR is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus one year lagged value of debt due 
in one year. 
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Summary statistics for variables important for our analyses are presented in Table 
1. The current maturity long term debt for the average firm in the sample is 3.3% of total 
assets. This is similar to Frank and Goyal (2003), who report the ratio of maturing long-
term debt to be four percent of net assets of an average firm. While the average firm is a 
net issuer of equity in the amount of 4.5 percent of total assets, most firms do not enter 
equity markets in any given year at all. The average firm in the sample is a net debt issuer 
in the amount of 5.2 percent of its total assets. The level of cash for the average firm is 
9.6 percent of total assets. The average size of financing deficit is also 9.6 percent of total 
assets. Around twenty-four percent of the analyzed firms have credit ratings. Almost half 
of new debt financing raised by a median firm is used to refinance maturing long-term 
debt, suggesting that it is an important reason for why firms issue new debt.9
3. Traditional Pecking Order Theory Tests  
3.1. Research design  
In our analysis, we estimate two SSM-style regressions of debt issuance on two 
measures of corporate financing needs. First, we test the relation between financing 
deficit, DEF, and net long-term debt issuance, NDISR, using the original SSM regression 
equation:  
                                         NDISRit = α + β×DEFit + εit.                                                 (4)  
According to the SSM hypothesis, we should expect α=0 and β=1, which would 
provide support for the pecking order prediction that managers finance shortfalls of 
internal funds solely with net debt issuance. We estimate this regression on our overall 
                                                 
9 We report only the median of the ratio of maturing debt to new debt financing as the other statistics are 
severely affected by extreme observations of this variable. 
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sample and in various subsamples to confirm that the results of the earlier studies hold in 
our sample and to generate a baseline set of results to which the results from our second 
set of tests are compared.  
            For our main set of tests, we modify regression (4) by replacing the independent 
variable, financing deficit, with one of its components -- the portion of outstanding long-
term debt that matures within year t, R.10
                                          DISRit = α + β×Rit + εit.                                                        (5)  
          The dependent variable in (5) is also modified. The traditional tests of the pecking 
order theory using regression (4) assume symmetry in pecking order behavior for security 
issues and repurchases. Positive values of financial deficit, DEF, represent a use of funds 
that is financed by issuing debt (positive NDISR), whereas negative values of financial 
deficit represent a surplus of funds that is used to retire debt (negative NDISR). Thus, for 
both security issues and repurchases, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient on NDISR 
in regression (4) should be one. 
           Similar to positive financial deficit, maturing debt is expected to be financed with 
new debt issuance. Unlike financial deficit, maturing debt is strictly a use of funds 
variable. None of its values imply existence of a surplus of funds that can be used to 
repurchase additional securities. As a result, regression (5) can be used to test the 
predictions of the pecking order theory only with respect to security issues but not with 
respect to security repurchases. Accordingly, the dependent variable, NDISR, is 
transformed from a variable that measures both debt issues and reductions into a measure 
                                                 
10 One way to look at regression model (5) is as an instrumental variable version of regression model (4) 
with maturing debt serving as an instrument for financing deficit.   
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of debt issuance only, DISR. Specifically, DISR is formed by replacing all negative 
values of NDISR with zeroes, to reflect the fact that there is no debt issuance in these 
cases and other sources of funds are used to finance maturing debt, R.  
With the dependent variable, DISR, censored at zero, regression equation (5) has 
to be estimated as a Tobit regression. This model also lends itself as a natural 
specification for testing the preference for internal funds under the pecking order 
hypothesis. Specifically, whereas the independent variable, DEF, in equation (4) is, by 
definition, the sum of new debt and equity issued, the independent variable, R, in 
equation (5) is an ex ante measure of funds that are required to refinance maturing debt.  
These funds can be generated internally or raised externally in the form of debt or 
equity. The pecking order theory states that firms prefer internal financing to external 
financing.  
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of pecking order firm behavior on the relation 
between the amount of maturing debt and debt issuance. Small amounts of maturing debt 
that can be refinanced internally are paid off with cash with no debt issued. These are the 
censored observations (to the left of point C), with new debt issuance at zero. Once they 
exhaust internal sources of funds, firms start issuing new debt. These are the observations 
to the right of point C, where debt issuance increases with the amount of maturing debt.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, our expectations for the coefficient estimates in regression 
(5) should be somewhat different from the expectations for the coefficient estimates in 
regression (4). Specifically, with preference for internal financing (positive C) the 
coefficient estimate for the intercept, α, in regression (5) should be negative.  
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We should stress that this identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of the 
independent variable, R, in equation (5).11 The same strategy cannot be applied to 
equation (4) to identify the order in which debt and equity are issued. The independent 
variable in (4), DEF, is endogenous, as it is simply the sum of new debt, DISR, and new 
equity issued. If large (small) new issues tend to be of any particular type (debt or 
equity), then the relation between DISR and DEF would depend on the magnitude of 
DEF, which could induce the intercept in regression (4) to be non-zero.  
           Unlike the intercept, the estimate for the coefficient β on maturing long-term debt 
is expected to be close to one, as in regression (4). Once the firm exhausts its internal 
funds and turns to new debt, each additional dollar of maturing debt is expected to be 
financed with a dollar of new debt. Debt capacity is not expected to be a significant 
constraining factor since additional debt capacity is released by the maturing debt.  
Our dataset represents an unbalanced panel of 113,768 firm-year observations. 
We follow Fama and French (2002) and report in our tables the results obtained by 
estimating cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for each of our 36 
sample years and then using the time series of parameter estimates to obtain their means 
and standard deviations. This procedure addresses concerns that the t-statistics may be 
affected by correlation across firms within each year. We then apply Newey-West (1987) 
adjustment to the time-series standard errors and t-statistics to address concerns about 
time-series correlation in the estimated coefficients.12 We have also estimated pooled 
                                                 
11 The amount of long-term debt maturing in the current year is a result of an endogenous maturity choice 
decision made by the firm at the time the debt was issued. We expect that this choice was affected by the 
firm’s characteristics at the time of issuance. The amount of maturing debt is exogenous, however, with 
respect to firm characteristics and decisions made at maturity. 
12 We use three lags in calculating Newey-West t-statistics. 
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cross-section time-series regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and within-firm and within-year clustering.13 The conclusions of the paper are not 
sensitive to these alternative estimation choices. Furthermore, the presented t-statistics 
are generally more conservative than the unreported alternative estimates.  
3.2. Full sample results  
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates for regressions (4) and (5). The t-
statistics for the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to 
one are reported in parentheses. We find that around forty three percent of financing 
deficit is financed by net debt issuance. While that coefficient is not at all close to 1, 
rejecting the original SSM hypothesis, it is comparable to the coefficient estimates 
reported by Frank and Goyal (2003). The SSM hypothesis is also rejected for the 
intercept, which, although economically small, is statistically significantly greater than 
zero.  
What is interesting, are the results from equation (5) regressing debt issuance on 
the current maturity long-term debt. We find that firms, on average, finance 103.5 percent 
of their maturing long-term debt with new debt issuance. The coefficient of 1.035 on the 
maturing long-term debt is not statistically different from one, consistent with the 
pecking order theory. In addition, the statistically significant negative intercept (-0.016) is 
also consistent with the pecking order hypothesis that firms start issuing new debt only 
after internal funds are depleted. Jointly, the estimates of the intercept (-0.016) and the 
slope (1.035) suggest that, for an average firm, maturing debt in the amount of up to 1.6 
                                                 
13 Petersen (2008) recommends using firm-level clustered standard errors in corporate finance applications. 
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percent of total assets is financed with cash, with larger amounts of maturing debt 
triggering new debt issuance.  
3.3. Size-based subsamples  
We, next, reestimate our regressions for the subsamples considered in the prior 
empirical studies of the pecking order theory. Specifically, Frank and Goyal (2003) find 
that larger firms tend to finance a significantly larger portion of their financing deficit 
with new debt. This is a puzzling result as it implies that the pecking order theory is a 
better descriptor of the financing behavior of firms with a lower degree of information 
asymmetry. Lemmon and Zender (2007) offer an explanation for the “puzzle” by arguing 
that small firms are unable to issue additional debt because of their limited debt capacity. 
Since maturing debt frees up capacity for new debt issuance, corporate financing choices 
are less likely to be driven by debt capacity constraints when firms refinance their 
maturing debt. Thus, we can test the debt capacity hypothesis by comparing the 
estimation results of regressions (4) and (5) for subsamples based on firm size.  
Each year, we group the sample firms into quartiles based on the dollar value of 
annual sales. We then pool observations from different years but same size quartiles into 
four size-based subsamples and estimate regressions (4) and (5) separately for each of 
these subsamples. The results are presented in Table 3.  
The results for regression (4) are similar to the results from the prior literature. 
The coefficient estimates on financing deficit increase monotonically as we move from 
the quartile of the smallest firms (0.333) to the quartile containing the largest firms 
(0.785). These results imply that, compared to the smallest firms, the largest firms use 
more than twice as much debt when covering their financing deficit.  
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In contrast, the coefficient estimates on maturing debt (regression (5)) 
monotonically decline as we move from the quartile of the smallest firms (1.110) to the 
quartile containing the largest firms (0.889). This pattern is consistent with the 
predictions of the pecking order theory as firms with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry (smaller firms) rely more heavily on debt financing than do firms with less 
information asymmetry.  
Another interesting result is the pattern of intercepts in the regression reported in 
Panel B. The most negative estimate (-0.028) is observed for firms in the smallest size 
quartile. As we move across size quartiles, the intercepts become progressively less 
negative, with the intercept for the largest firms (0.000) being statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. This pattern is consistent with pecking order hypothesis that 
firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry rely more on internal funds as they 
incur higher costs of adverse selection when raising external financing.  
Overall, the results in panels A and B of Table 3 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that smaller firms generally operate closer to their debt capacity and, 
therefore, have to rely on new debt to a lesser degree than do larger firms. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, the slope coefficient estimates in panels A and B are closer in 
magnitude for the largest firm quartile, but diverge as we move to smaller firm quartiles. 
This suggests that the largest firms are relatively unconstrained by debt capacity both 
when they refinance their maturing debt and when they cover financing deficit in general. 
Smaller firms, on the other hand, are more constrained by debt capacity with the 
constraint relaxing when they refinance maturing debt. Hence, the slope coefficient 
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estimates from regression (5) (Panel B) become increasingly larger relative to the 
coefficient estimates from regression (4) (Panel A) as we consider smaller firms.  
3.4. Credit rating subsamples  
In this section, we split our sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm 
has a credit rating, which we use as a measure of access to public debt markets. Lemmon 
and Zender (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the reasons why the existence of 
rated debt should be related to the firm’s debt capacity. Specifically, firms with no credit 
ratings tend to have more volatile cash flows and lower collateral value of assets, and 
tend to be more informationally opaque to allow access to arms-length debt. These firms 
also tend to have higher costs of financial distress, which is why they tend to borrow 
from banks and other financial intermediaries that are efficient at reorganizing distressed  
firms. As a result, even if these firms do prefer to finance internal shortfalls with debt, 
some of them may be unable to do so.  
Because of concerns about misidentifying firms that have chosen to rely on equity 
financing despite having the capacity to issue rated debt as debt capacity constrained, 
Lemmon and Zender (2007) use the predicted probability of having rated debt as their 
primary indicator. These issues are less of a concern in the current study as we focus on 
how firms refinance their pre-existing debt when it matures. We, therefore, use an 
indicator of whether a firm has rated debt and do not generate probabilities of having 
rated debt.  
For this analysis, we use only data starting from 1986, the year Compustat starts 
its coverage of credit ratings. The results for regression (4) are presented in Table 4, 
Panel A. The results show that, whereas debt constrained firms finance only 27.3 percent 
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of their deficit with new debt issuance, their unconstrained counterparts with full access 
to debt markets finance 81.6 percent of deficit with new debt. These results are consistent 
with the findings in the earlier literature.  
The results for regression (5) are presented in Panel B. Managers of rated firms 
finance 91.3 percent of their maturing long-term debt with new debt issuance. This 
number is larger but similar to the proportion of new debt (81.6 percent) they use to cover 
their financing deficit, consistent with view that these firms are not very constrained in 
terms of their access to debt markets. In contrast, for unrated firms the difference between 
the fractions of new debt used to finance the maturing long term debt (107.6 percent) and 
the fraction of new debt used to cover internal fund shortfall (27.3 percent) is much 
larger. This suggests that firms with limited access to credit markets may have lower debt  
 capacity, which limits their ability to finance shortfalls of internal funds with additional 
debt.  
The intercept is insignificant in the case of rated firms, suggesting that adverse 
selection costs are not a major concern for informationally transparent rated firms when 
they issue debt. In contrast, the intercept is significantly different from zero for unrated 
firms, suggesting that adverse selection costs incurred in the process of debt issuance are 
significant in the case of these informationally more opaque firms.  
3.5. Subperiod results  
Arguing that firms, as well as conditions under which they operate, change over 
time, Frank and Goyal (2003) conduct separate tests of the pecking order hypothesis for 
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the SSM (prior to 1990) and the post-SSM (after 1990) periods.14 We do the same and 
run regressions (4) and (5) separately for the period from 1971 to 1989 and for the period 
from 1990 to 2006. Table 5 reports the results.  
Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003), we find that the slope coefficient 
estimate in regression (4) is higher prior to 1990. As reported in Panel A, during the 
1971-1989 time period, firms financed 54.5 percent of their shortfall of internal funds 
with debt issuance. In contrast, only 27.9 percent of financing deficit is financed with 
new debt after 1989.15
Panel B presents the estimation results for regression (5) for the same two 
subperiods. The results are quite different from those reported in Panel A. Specifically, 
firms finance 100.6 percent of their maturing debt with new long-term debt issuance prior  
to 1990, with the fraction of debt in refinancing of maturing long-term debt slightly rising 
in the second half of our sample to reach 107.1 percent. One possible explanation for the 
widely diverging results in Panels A and B could be that firms are operating much closer 
to their debt capacity in the later period (after 1989). Consistent with this view, the credit 
rating of an average firm in 1985 is BBB+, whereas the average rating in 2005 is between 
BBB- and BB+, i.e., 2.5 notches lower.  
To summarize, the patterns of how different types of firms fund their financing 
deficit developed in this paper are consistent with prior literature and offer mixed support 
for the pecking order theory. Replacing financing deficit with maturing long-term debt in 
the SSM style regressions significantly strengthens the case for the pecking order theory.  
                                                 
14 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study data from the period 1971-1989 
15 Huang and Ritter (2007) also report similar differences between the early and the late parts of their 
sample. 
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4. Order of financing  
The results in Section II show that the original SSM hypothesis that firms 
primarily rely on new debt financing is confirmed to a high degree when we focus on 
how firms refinance their maturing long-term debt. In addition, the negative intercept 
estimates for regression (5) indicate that firms fund maturing debt first from another 
source of funds before turning to issuance of new debt. In this section, we test whether 
the source of funds that precedes new debt is indeed internal cash as predicted by the 
pecking order theory.  
To identify the order of financing, we examine the relation between the amount of 
cash held by the firm and the intercept in regression (5). Firms with more cash would be 
able to refinance larger amounts of maturing debt without raising external funds. If firms 
prefer internal funds to debt financing, then we should observe more negative intercepts 
for firms with more cash on hand.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates for regression (5) estimated 
separately for firms grouped into quartiles based on accumulated cash.16 The results are 
consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory. The intercept estimates are 
negative for all cash quartiles, albeit insignificantly so for the first two quartiles. More 
importantly, the intercepts monotonically decline (become more negative) with cash, 
implying that firms prefer to use cash to refinance maturing debt and start issuing new 
debt only when the amount of maturing debt becomes too large relative to the cash on 
hand. For example, the coefficient estimates for firms in the highest quartile imply that an 
                                                 
16 Cash is defined as cash and short-term investments (data 1) scaled by total assets.  
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average firm in this quartile uses cash to pay off maturing debt in the amount of up to 4.4 
percent of total assets, with higher values of maturing debt triggering new debt issuance.  
Because adverse selection costs are higher when issuing equity than when issuing 
debt, the pecking order theory predicts that internal funds not only precede debt but that 
they precede external financing in general. To test this hypothesis we reestimate equation 
(5) with total external financing (debt and equity) as the dependent variable separately for 
each financial slack quartile. The results presented in Panel B are not consistent with the 
pecking order theory. None of the intercepts are significantly negative and we observe no 
monotonic pattern of changes in intercepts as we move from the lowest to the highest 
cash quartile.  
The conflicting results in Table 6 (cash precedes debt financing but does not 
precede total external financing) suggest that firms may be issuing equity out of the 
pecking order. To gain additional insight into how new debt and equity issues are used to 
finance maturing debt, Figure 1 plots the amounts of debt issued against the amounts of 
maturing debt whereas Figure 2 plots the amounts of equity issued against the amounts of  
maturing debt. Figure 1 shows that, although there are many debt issues of various sizes 
at low levels of maturing debt, there is a distinct positive relation between the amount of 
maturing debt and the amount of new debt issued. In contrast, there is no discernable 
relation between maturing debt and equity issuance in Figure 2. Combined with the fact 
that most equity issues, both large and small, are observed at low levels of maturing debt, 
this suggests that equity issues are primarily used to finance other, e.g., investment, needs 
and not to refinance maturing debt. This is consistent with the findings in Leary and 
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Roberts (2007) that firms do not follow the pecking order when they raise funds for their 
investment projects.  
5. Alternative interpretations and further tests  
The finding that firms tend to refinance practically all of their maturing debt with 
new debt issuance has an alternative interpretation. If an average firm is close to its target 
debt level, then it is not surprising from the point of view of the tradeoff theory that it 
maintains its target capital structure by simply rolling over its maturing debt. In this 
section, we examine how measures of deviation from target affect the financing of 
maturing debt. Because target leverage is not observable, we follow the standard 
approach in the literature and proxy the target level of leverage with the predicted value 
from the following regression.  
LTDit = β0 + β1×LTDFit + β2×Sizeit + β3×MBit + β4×Tngit + β5×RDit + β6×RDDMit 
+ β7×Expit + εit.                                                                                                               (6)  
In (6), the dependent variable, LTD, is the long-term debt ratio.17 Following 
earlier research, the set of independent variables consists of firm characteristics believed   
to proxy for the factors identified by the tradeoff theory as important determinants of the 
target and includes firm size, asset tangibility (Tng), market-to-book (MB), research and 
development expenses (RD), and selling expenses (Exp).18 Because a large number of 
                                                 
17 Long-term debt ratio is long-term debt (data 9) scaled by assets (data 6). 
18 These variables have been previously considered by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), among others. Size is the natural log of sales (data 12), adjusted for inflation. Tangibility is the 
property, plant, and equipment (data 8) scaled by total assets. R&D is the research and development 
expense (data 46) scaled by sales. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative expense (data 189) 
over sales. Market-to-book is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Book equity is the 
book value of stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if 
available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption (data 
56), liquidation (data 10), or par value (data 130) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. 
Stockholders’ equity is (data 216), if it is available. If not, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book 
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firms with no R&D do not report it, we set missing values for R&D to zero. Since firms 
that do not report R&D may be different from those that do, we include an indicator 
variable, RDDM, set to one for firms with non-missing R&D. Motivated by the finding in 
Lemmon, Zender, and Roberts (2008) that firms’ future debt ratios are closely related to 
their initial debt ratios, we also include the firm’s initial long-term debt ratio (LTDF) as 
an additional independent variable capturing unobserved between-firm heterogeneity.19  
We use the estimates from regression (6) to proxy the deviation from target 
leverage with the difference between the predicted value, LTD*, and the actual long-term 
debt ratio, LTD.20 We then examine whether these deviations affect how firms refinance 
their maturing debt. A significant problem with this approach is that most of the 
determinants of target leverage used in regression (6) can also be thought of as 
determinants of debt capacity (Fama and French (2002)).21 Therefore, one could view the 
deviation of the firm’s debt ratio from the predicted value, LTD*-LTD, as a proxy for 
how close the firm is to its debt capacity. As a result, even if the proportion of maturing 
debt refinanced with new debt issuance (the slope coefficient in regression (5)) did vary 
with the distance from the predicted debt ratio, such a finding could imply either that 
target leverage ratios were important or that firms generally followed the pecking order 
of financing, but deviated from it when constrained by their debt capacity.22  
                                                                                                                                                 
value of common equity (data 60) plus the par value of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus 
total liabilities (data 181).  
 
19 The initial debt ratio is measured as the firm’s chronologically first nonmissing debt ratio available on 
Compustat. To avoid identity in each firm’s initial year, all initial years are dropped from regression (6). 
20 The results of estimation of regression (6) are not reported for brevity. These results are standard and are 
available upon request. 
21 Indeed, Agca and Mozumdar (2007) use a similar set of variables as determinants of debt capacity.  
 
22 This is known as the complex version of the pecking order theory (Myers (1984)). 
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Fortunately, our empirical approach allows us to differentiate between the target 
leverage and the debt capacity interpretations of LTD*, as these two hypotheses have 
different predictions with respect to the intercept in regression (5). Specifically, there is 
no reason, under the tradeoff theory, to expect firms to exhibit preference for internal 
financing. This is especially true for firms with debt ratios well below their target level. 
Whereas a firm with excess leverage (low LTD*-LTD) may be inclined to use cash to pay 
down a portion of its maturing debt, a firm with leverage deficit (high LTD*-LTD) should 
show no such preference. Thus, we would expect the intercept in regression (5) not to be 
negative, especially, for high LTD*-LTD firms. In contrast, under the pecking order 
theory, firms always prefer internal funds, regardless of their position with respect to the 
debt capacity.  
5.1. Subsamples based on deviation from predicted leverage  
We, first, test these hypotheses by estimating regression (5) separately for firms sorted 
into quartiles on the basis of their estimated deviation from predicted leverage, LTD*-
LTD. These results are presented in Table 7.23  
           The pattern of intercepts observed across the quartile subsamples is not consistent 
with the tradeoff hypothesis. Specifically, the intercepts in the first three quartiles of 
LTD*-LTD are very similar and imply that these firms refinance small amounts of 
maturing debt (up to 1.2-1.4 percent of assets, on average) with internal funds, after 
which they start issuing new debt. The intercept in the highest LTD*-LTD quartile is 
substantially more negative, implying that these firms use exclusively internal financing 
                                                 
23 The results are qualitatively similar when we first split the sample in two based on whether LTD*-LTD is 
positive (leverage deficit) or negative (leverage surplus), and then split each subsample in two based on the 
median values of leverage deficit and leverage surplus, respectively. 
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when the amount of maturing debt does not exceed about two percent of total assets.24 
Within the tradeoff framework, these would be the most underlevered firms in our sample 
and, as such, they should be less likely to use internal equity and more likely to issue 
debt.  
The significantly negative intercepts observed across all four subsamples are more 
consistent with the pecking order theory modified to account for limited debt capacity. 
Because of adverse selection costs, firms always prefer to finance small amounts of 
maturing debt with internal funds. Hence, the intercepts are negative regardless of where 
the firm stands relative to its debt capacity.  
The slope coefficient estimates imply that, as the amount of maturing debt 
becomes too large to be financed internally, firms with little spare debt capacity (low 
LTD*-LTD) start replacing each additional dollar of maturing debt with a dollar of new 
debt. When firms with more spare debt capacity (high LTD*-LTD) start issuing new debt, 
however, they not only replace each marginal dollar of maturing debt with new debt, but 
also issue additional debt so that the amount of internal funds used to refinance maturing 
debt declines with the size of debt due. In effect, these firms replenish their internal 
financing slack using proceeds from debt issuance. For example, for firms in the fourth 
quartile, when maturing debt is at two percent of total assets, it is 100 percent internally 
refinanced. By the time the amount of maturing debt reaches four percent of total assets it 
becomes 100 percent refinanced with new debt. This type of behavior makes sense if the 
costs of adverse selection incurred when issuing debt are, to a significant extent, fixed.  
 
                                                 
24 Calculated as 0.028 / 1.457 = 0.0192. 
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5.2. Regression results  
To simultaneously take into account the effects of both availability of internal 
funds and deviation from predicted leverage, LTD*-LTD, we estimate an expanded 
version of regression (5), allowing both the intercept and the slope to vary with 
accumulated cash as well as with LTD*-LTD.  
DISRit=α×(γ0+γ1Cashit+γ2(LTD*it-LTDit))+β×(δ0+δ1Cashit+δ2(LTD*it-LTDit))×Rit+εit =  
= α0+α1Cashit+α2(LTD*it-LTDit) + β0Rit +β1Cashit×Rit +β2(LTD*it-LTDit)×Rit + εit.         (7)  
In (7), Cashit and deviation from target leverage, (LTD*it-LTDit), are measured at the 
beginning of period t.  
Reduced form coefficient (α) estimates for regression (7) are presented in Table 8. 
The results provide support for the complex version of the pecking order theory with 
limited debt capacity. The intercept in the regression (-0.004) is insignificantly different 
from zero and the slope coefficient of R (1.037) is insignificantly different from one. 
These results imply that a firm that has no financial slack and is unconstrained by debt 
capacity refinances one hundred percent of its maturing debt with new debt issuance.  
Consistent with the pecking order theory, the coefficient estimate on cash is 
significantly negative whereas the coefficient on the interaction term Cash×R is 
insignificant. The negative effect of cash on the intercept implies that the probability of 
debt issuance declines with the size of the firm’s cash position. The insignificant effect of   
cash on the slope implies that, for firms that issue debt, the proportion of debt in total 
new financing is unaffected by the firm’s cash position. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that firms issue debt only after exhausting internal sources of funds. 
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           Consistent with the debt capacity hypothesis, the interaction effect (LTD*-LTD)×R 
is significantly positive indicating that the proportion of maturing debt that is refinanced 
with new debt increases with debt capacity, LTD*-LTD. The coefficient on (LTD*-LTD) 
itself, however, is insignificant, implying that firms always prefer internal funds over 
external debt regardless of their position relative to their debt capacity.  
To summarize, consistent with the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal 
funds to debt issuance when they refinance their maturing long-term debt. This relation is 
unaffected by whether the firm is under- or over-levered. Firms tend to use less new debt 
to refinance their maturing debt when they are closer to their debt capacity.  
6. Conclusions  
We test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance maturing long-
term debt. Our results offer support for the predictions of the pecking order theory 
regarding the use of internal funds and debt financing. Managers first finance their 
maturing long-term debt with internal funds and then turn to new debt issuance.  
These findings are confirmed over different periods of time, across firms of 
different sizes, with different access to credit markets, and with different levels of 
internal funds. In contrast to the earlier literature, we find very strong support for the 
pecking order theory among small high growth firms as well as among debt capacity 
constrained firms. Our results also show that the fraction of new debt used to refinance 
the marginal dollar of maturing debt declines with the extent to which the firm is close to 
its debt capacity. However, regardless of their spare debt capacity, firms always prefer 
internal funds to external debt.  
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ESSAY 2: 
 
Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies 
 
1.  Introduction 
  In the year 2007, 67 initial public offerings, or 23% of total IPO market activity, 
went to the little known Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (hereafter SPAC). In 
2008, 17 out of 50, or 34%, of IPO deals were SPACs.25 In contrast, in the period 
between 1998 and 2002 there were no SPAC related IPOs; in 2003, there was only one. 
Interestingly, in the first half of 2009, there was no SPAC activity in the equity issuance 
markets at all. 
This recent development in capital markets demands a closer examination of 
SPACs and their characteristics. A SPAC is a clean shell company that acquires public 
status through the IPO process and is specifically formed to purchase one or more 
operating businesses over a certain amount of time, usually two years. Proceeds raised 
through the IPO are placed in escrow accounts and are kept there until SPAC founders 
are able to close the deal with potential targets. If an appropriate target is not found 
within the two-year period after the IPO, the SPAC is liquidated and funds from the 
escrow accounts are returned to investors.  
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) classifies SPACs as blank check 
companies under the 6770 SIC code, and technically defines them as “very small 
companies” typically involving speculative investments that fall within the SEC’s 
                                                 
25 Ritter (2009) “ Some Factoids About the 2008 IPO Market “ 
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definition of “penny stocks” or "microcap stocks.” At the same time, the SEC’s rule 3a-
51-1 excludes from the formal definition of “penny stocks” any stock issuer with total net 
assets valued higher than $5 million after the IPO. Since all SPACs entering capital 
markets after 2003 raised more than $5 million through their IPO, they are not classified 
as penny stock blank checks, and they consequently avoid the scrutiny of the SEC rules 
that apply to penny stocks.26
 The academic finance literature on SPACs is still in the very early stages of 
development. Jog and Sun (2007) wrote the first paper that both explains some of the 
characteristics of SPACs and examines the realized returns to original founders and 
investors. Their sample includes 62 SPACs over the 2003-2006 time period, and is based 
on a subsample of 24 companies with available data on SPAC founders with annualized 
returns of 1900% to them. In a similar subsample that includes 42 SPACs with complete 
data on SPAC investors, the authors report a negative annual return of 3%. Boyer and 
Baigent (2008) examine characteristics of 87 SPACs that went public from June 2003 
until December 2006 and report that SPACs exhibit less underpricing than regular IPOs. 
They also report a significant positive relationship between the share price at the issuance 
and the size of the offering. Flores (2008) also mentions SPACS, comparing reverse 
mergers with penny stock issuances as an alternative way to go public. He includes 12 
SPACS in his sample of 408 reverse mergers. Recently, Lawellen (2008) made an 
argument that SPACs represent an important entity in the capital markets and that they 
should be considered a separate asset class. Finally, Jenkinson and Sousa (2009) analyze 
58 SPACs that completed mergers showing that half of the deals were value destroying.  
                                                 
26 As the response to speculative activities in blank check markets during the 1980s, the SEC introduced 
rule 419-a in 1992 to regulate offerings of blank check companies. Within that legislation, rule 3a-51-1 
defines what is considered a blank check and penny stock issuer.  
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 Beyond the academic finance literature, the redevelopment of SPACs in the 
capital markets has also received much attention in law related literature. Reimer (2007) 
concludes that SPACs can be considered a beneficial financial innovation, especially due 
to the constraints that the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed on small firms attempting to 
raise funds in the public markets. He considers SPACs a substitute to private equity 
firms. Sjostrom (2008) compares different ways to go public, and finds SPACs to be a 
viable alternative to traditional IPOs from the perspective of an acquired company 
because they bring in a cash infusion, share liquidity, and vested-in underwriters. 
  There is no general agreement on the performance of SPAC securities, their 
characteristics, data used, or underlying indexes. We provide additional evidence on 
SPAC activity in the period from 2003 until July 2009. Our analysis shows that securities 
issued by SPACs react differently when the intention to change their corporate status is 
announced. While the holders of all three securities realize abnormal returns, the 
strongest effect is observed among the investors holding warrants; stock holders, on the 
other hand, tend to react very mildly. In addition to this finding, we demonstrate that the 
presence of Early Bird Capital as the lead underwriter of the IPO increases the likelihood 
of a successful merger combination. 
 This paper is organized as follows: Part I constitutes the introduction in which we 
define SPACs.  Part II provides a short history of the blank check market, as well as a full 
description of modern SPACs, their sample and characteristics, and important stages in 
their limited corporate life. Part III examines the characteristics of SPAC stakeholders, 
namely SPAC founders, SPAC underwriters, and SPAC investors, and sketches their 
incentives. Part IV examines SPACs’ performance at different stages of their corporate 
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life, while comparing results with SPACs reported in previous studies. Part V offers a 
conclusion and proposes some further research questions on SPACs. 
2.    Sample and SPAC description 
2.1 History of blank check market 
 
 Modern SPACs in the period between 2003 and 2009 represent an innovative way 
to reestablish blank check markets, which have long existed in similar forms. According 
to Cowing (1957), blank checks as blind pools were first mentioned in England during 
the 18th century.27 Graham and Dodd (1934) explain that blind pools were imported to 
US capital markets from UK capital markets in the form of so-called “investment trusts” 
in the early 1920s.28 More recently, blank checks gained popularity among certain classes 
of promoters and investors in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. They were mostly 
penny stock issues with shares listed on OTC markets and with very limited guarantees to 
initial investors. The lack of regulation and the enforcement of existing rules led to a 
certain pattern of behavior where blank check promoters frequently took advantage of 
original investors. Reimer (2007) quotes several SEC hearing reports according to which, 
by the end of 1980s, fraud and abuse in the penny stock market reached “epidemic 
proportions.”29 In order to protect capital formation and keep investor confidence intact, 
Congress passed the Penny Stock Reform Act (1990), which instructed the SEC to adopt 
rules that govern registration statements filed by blank check companies issuing penny 
                                                 
27 During England's 18th century South Sea Bubble, an unknown promoter raised money through a stock 
offering for a "company carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody is to know what it is." 
28 “The American “investment” trusts functioned as blind speculative pools, administered in many cases by 
men of reputation and ability who were carried away by the universal madness. These new “creations” 
played a double role in intensifying the speculative orgy, for they were themselves both active speculators 
and active media of speculation.” Graham and Dodd (1937) 
29 The management team would exercise its warrants in conjunction with the supposed merger with or 
acquisition of a private company with the hope that the market would respond favorably to such an 
announcement. Once the stock price jumped, the management team  profited by dumping its shares. 
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stocks. In 1992, the SEC introduced rule 419-a, which established regulation of the blank 
check market.  
 Rule 419-a explicitly outlines the behavior of all promoters involved in blank 
check offerings.30 It requires blank check companies to keep raised funds in specially 
established escrow accounts maintained by an insured depository institution until the 
acquisition is consummated. The rule also determines that acquired businesses must have 
net assets of at least 80% of the funds deposited in the escrow accounts. The rule 
prohibits the trading of blank check securities until a merger or acquisition occurs. In 
addition, blank check companies’ founders are required to provide investors with audited 
quarterly and annual financial statements. 
 The increased scrutiny of the blank check market by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers in 1997 led to a revocation of licenses of chief executive officers of 
GKN Securities Corporation, the main promoter of blank checks.31 After the event, 
activities in the blank check market ceased until 2003. In August 2003, the small 
investment bank Early Bird Capital underwrote the first SPAC in an attempt to 
reestablish the blank check market. By raising more than $5 million through the IPO and 
by pricing securities above the minimum price that would classify them as penny stocks, 
SPAC underwriters and founders avoided the scrutiny of the SEC rules that regulate 
penny stock markets, and instead became subject to the rules for general companies. 
                                                 
30 SEC Release 33-6932 summarizes Rule 419-a requirements.  
31 NASD News Release 1997 “ From December, 1993 through April, 1996, GKN dominated and controlled 
the immediate after-market trading in eight securities it underwrote, which resulted in no competitive 
market.  GKN was able to charge excessive markups ranging from six percent to as much as 67 percent 
over the prevailing market price in more than 1,500 transactions. At least 90 percent of these transactions 
were fraudulent because the mark-up exceeded 10 percent (a level considered fraudulent).” As a result, the 
CEO of the company and twenty nine supervisors and brokers were fined and suspended. 
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From August 2003 until July 2009, 161 SPACs raised capital, and today their securities 
are listed on all major US stock exchanges. 
2.2 Modern SPACs 
A.   Formation  
 SPACs are formed by their sponsors with the unique purpose to acquire or merge 
with other companies using the cash previously raised through the IPO. The process is 
complicated; in addition to the involvement of SPAC sponsors, it requires the expertise of 
legal advisors and underwriters in order to comply with the rules imposed by the SEC 
and by the exchanges on which SPACs list their shares. 
 The formation of a SPAC is announced by filing an S-1 registration statement 
form with the SEC. The S-1 form consists of all the important information regarding the 
SPAC’s organization and intentions. It is a very lengthy document that includes a 
certificate of registration, a registration statement, an underwriting agreement, securities 
certificates, an escrow agreement, and the auditor’s consent. The form provides details 
about sponsors’ professional and academic backgrounds and disclosures to potential 
public investors regarding the risks involved in the process from the moment of the IPO 
until the merger.  It also informs investors about corporate governance and compliance 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the S-1 form, SPAC sponsors state their compensation 
levels at all stages of the life of the company.  
 Once the SEC verifies the S-1 form, the focus of SPAC sponsors or managers 
turns toward the IPO process. 32 All the important information governing the IPO is 
recorded in the final prospectus Form B423. 
 
                                                 
32 On the average it takes 221 calendar days from the filing of the intention to raise funds until the IPO.  
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B.       IPO event 
 Typical SPACs conduct an IPO by selling units. Usually, each unit consists of one 
common share and one warrant to buy a share in the future at a discounted price. 33 The 
use of cash proceeds raised through the IPO is determined in the registration statements 
and their amendments. Typically, about 5% of raised cash is used to pay upfront for 
underwriters’ fees, regular administrative and legal expenses, the cost of office space, the 
cost of registering securities, and employees’ monthly salaries. The remaining 95% of the 
funds are placed in an escrow account opened with an insured depositary institution, 
where the funds earn a T-bill rate until they are used in an acquisition. 34
 The establishment of an escrow account is very important in this process. First, it 
demonstrates to potential investors the SPAC’s voluntary compliance with SEC rule 419-
a, which requires blank check companies to establish an escrow account. Second, an 
escrow account provides assurance to public investors that a majority of their funds is 
going to be preserved independently of the success of the business combination. 
 While the SEC’s rule 419-a forbids penny stock companies from trading 
securities until the merger is consummated, SPAC founders and underwriters offer 
immediate trading in units after the IPO. The units are, on average, dissolved 45 days 
after the IPO, and only then can trading of underlying shares and warrants commence. 
The commencement of separate trading in shares and warrants is conditional on the 
approval of the underwriter and the filing of the 8-K form with the SEC, which includes 
an audited balance sheet reflecting the proceeds from the public offering, as well as an 
                                                 
33 The structure of Units changed over time, and while in the first few years the Unit would usually consist 
of 1 share and 1 warrant to buy 2 common shares, lately a Unit more often consists of 1 share and 1 warrant 
to buy 1 share, and sometimes even 3/4 or 1/2 of the warrant. 
34 Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines what represents “insured depositary institution “ in section 3 (c ) 
 32
over-allotment exercise of units by underwriters, if necessary. While warrants are 
tradable immediately after the approval of the underwriter, they cannot be exercised until 
the completion of a business combination.  
 The units of SPACs, along with their shares and warrants, are traded on OTC 
markets, AMEX/NYSE and NASDAQ.35At first, and especially in the 2003–2005 period, 
SPAC units, shares, and warrants were listed and traded on illiquid OTC markets. In 
2005, AMEX decided to allow the listing of SPACs, while imposing on them rules 
regulating the minimal capital requirements, governance, compliance with Sarbanes 
Oxley, and the minimum price share. Compliance with listing rules was not sufficient to 
guarantee the actual listing on the exchange for every SPAC, but AMEX made the 
decision on an individual basis. In 2008, both NASDAQ and NYSE filed with the SEC to 
allow SPACs to list their securities. The main listing requirements for SPACs on all 
exchanges are presented in Appendix II.  
C.  Exit: Merger or Liquidation  
 The IPO date represents the first day of the public life of the SPAC. But, unlike 
for the majority of other existing public corporations, it also determines very precisely the 
last day of the SPAC’s life. Because SPACs are formed with the unique purpose of 
acquiring or merging with other businesses over a limited period of time, the date of two 
years after the IPO event on average represents the last day of their public life as an 
original entity. If SPAC managers are unable to find a business combination in that given 
time frame, the SPAC is dissolved and existing public investors are entitled to distribute 
funds from the escrow account proportionate to their share holdings. 
                                                 
35 On May 23, 2008, NYSE listed Heckman Corporation as its first SPAC. 
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The two years provided to SPAC promoters to find a proper business combination 
could be extended for an extra six months, assuming that the SPAC files a letter of intent 
with the SEC  to undertake a merger. Few SPACs in the sample with a focus on business 
combinations in Asia have extended the allowed time frame any longer due to expected 
regulatory troubles in China. Goldman Sachs, as the lead underwriter of the Liberty Line 
SPAC, argued in its public announcement of intentions that the time frame for SPAC 
sponsors to execute business combinations could impact both the identity of the potential 
investors in the SPAC and the success of the merger. Goldman Sachs proposed that 
SPACs should be given a longer time than the usual two years to conduct a business 
combination.36 It reasoned that the longer the time period between the IPO and the 
potential liquidation, the higher the chance to attract long term investors, such as pension 
and institutional funds.  
 The time limit for liquidation is also affected by stock exchange listing rules. In 
the early years, SPAC securities were traded at OTC markets, and consequently at 
AMEX, but the strict set of rules governing the time limit to liquidate SPAC was not 
established at that time. In most cases, a limit of 24 months was self-imposed by founders 
and underwriters. In 2008, two larger exchanges, the NASDAQ and the NYSE, 
announced plans to list SPACs and extended the time for finding a target to 36 months.  
In prospectus forms filed with the SEC, SPAC founders usually specify the 
industry or country target for their acquisition; however, they are not obliged by any 
formal rule to abide by this specification.  They are required to file regular quarterly and 
                                                 
36 In order to broaden interest among long term investors, this SPAC was structured to lower the percentage 
of shares owned by founders (7.5% instead of standard 20%), to lower the number of warrants in each unit, 
and to lower the underwriter’s fee. On May 28, 2008, Goldman Sachs announced that was unable to raise 
proceeds as planned and dissolved the Liberty Line SPAC. 
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annual financial statement forms with the SEC and to report any potential changes in 
their corporate status. Usually SPACs use the 8-K form or the 425 form to announce a 
business combination and to inform the public about it. In the announcement filing, the 
SPAC’s management explains the structure of the proposed business combination, and 
specifies the name of the target and the name of the new company if a merger occurs.  
 As a disclaimer to the announcement form, SPACs inform the shareholders that 
more details will be provided in the SEC-required joint proxy prospectus. They also state 
that the consummation of the deal is subject to the approval of the minimum percentage 
of public shareholders, as predetermined in the IPO prospectus forms filed by the SPAC.  
 The joint proxy prospectus forms follow the announcement of the business 
combination. Depending on the nature of the deal, there could be several of these forms, 
including preliminary information statements and preliminary proxy statements related to 
merger and acquisition, followed by definitive information or a definitive proxy 
statement. All of these forms record procedures and events surrounding the merger 
approval process, and provide full disclosure of the target business. This process can be 
time consuming since the SEC first reviews preliminary forms and then provides 
feedback to SPAC management. Only after the SEC approves the final content of the 
proxy statement forms can SPAC management create a definitive proxy document to 
send to shareholders.37   
 After the announcement of the merger combination and the approval by the SEC 
of the definitive proxy statement, the major task for SPAC managers is to obtain the 
support of shareholders for the proposed business combination on the actual date of the 
                                                 
37 Based on my conversation with SPAC promoters and underwriters, I conclude that they believe that the 
time spent by the SEC on reviewing these proxy statements was especially long during first few years of 
SPAC revival. 
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vote. All shareholders are entitled to vote on the business combination. In order for the 
deal to be approved, it cannot be rejected by more than a certain percentage of its 
investors as determined at the time of the IPO.  
 In the period between 2003 and 2006, typically the no-vote threshold was set at 
20% of shareholders votes. After 2006, that threshold was set on average at 30%. In 
reality, that means that if more than 20% of shareholders voted against the proposed 
business combination, the merger process would be suspended and the SPAC liquidated. 
If the SPAC announces its liquidation, all shareholders are entitled to divide the funds 
kept in the escrow accounts based on the number of shares they own.    
 If SPAC shareholders approve a business combination, SPAC managers together 
with their underwriters and legal counselors file new forms and notify the SEC of the 
issuance of securities related to the business combination. Finally, the 8-K form 
demonstrates that the remaining shareholders of the SPAC approved the transaction. That 
means that all of the funds held in the escrow accounts are released to the SPAC 
management and become available for use by the newly created company. 
2.3 The sample 
 After the first modern SPAC completed an IPO in August 2003, 263 SPACS 
registered to issue securities, and until July 1, 2009, 161 of them successfully conducted 
an IPO raising close to $23 billion in total proceeds. The focus of our study is on 161 
SPACs that conducted an IPO. The data for the study is derived from various sources.  
 The Edgar database is used to collect all relevant statistics on SPACs--from the 
initial filing of the preliminary prospectus S-1 forms, through the final prospectus 424-B 
forms and additional 8-K forms, to the 10Q statements filed immediately after the IPO. In 
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this paper, all of our reported statistics are derived from the aggregation of collected 
information in those forms and we have all the relevant data for the 161 SPACs that we 
analyzed.  
 The data on daily stock returns for 99 companies in the sample was extracted 
from the CRSP database. For the additional 50 companies, we collected daily prices 
using Bloomberg and Reuters platforms. We found data on SPAC unit prices and warrant 
prices from Bloomberg and Reuters, where we collected unit daily data for 111 
companies and warrant daily data for 80 companies.38 Table I shows that out of 161 
SPACs, 71 completed a merger by July 2009, 41 are still looking for an appropriate target 
or have announced a potential business combination, and 49 have been liquidated or have 
announced liquidation. 
3.   Stakeholders and their incentives 
3.1. Founders 
 The original SPAC founders are usually former or current executives who come 
from a variety of industries. In the financial press they are called SPAC sponsors, SPAC 
managers, or SPAC promoters. The filing forms reveal that SPAC sponsors come from 
all spheres of life, as well as from different areas across the globe. In some SPACs, 
managers disclose their involvement in blank check markets before 2003. Recently, some 
of the SPAC founders are investment companies, hedge funds, and private equity funds, 
where private equity managers see SPACs as a path to access public capital markets. 
Very often SPAC founders have previous experience in merger and acquisition activities. 
In most cases, five individuals are founders of a SPAC. 
                                                 
38 Daily prices on SPAC securities are becoming more readily available , but the major obstacle is the fact 
that vendors do not maintain historical unit and warrant data after SPACs either conduct a merger or 
liquidate 
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A. Typical investment 
 SPAC founders usually contribute $25,000 at the moment the shell is formed. In 
our sample, as shown in Table II, on average their initial investment is $57,000 
representing 100% of the SPAC equity. This equity stake represents, on average, 4.16 
million shares, costing each SPAC founder approximately $0.0137 per share. A typical 
SPAC founder discloses in the S-1 form the intention to devote a few hours of work per 
week to the SPAC and warns future investors of possible conflicts of interest due to 
involvement in similar competing companies. SPAC founders also inform investors about 
the high uncertainty of the merger’s success. If compensated, the average annual salary of 
a SPAC founder is $75.000. 
B. Typical payoffs for SPAC founders 
 SPAC founders raise funds by selling 80% of their equity stake through the IPO. 
The remaining 20% of equity remains with them and becomes more or less a finder’s fee 
in the case of a successful business combination. Besides the initial equity investment, 
founders commit to buy upfront, on average, 3.75 million warrants at an average price of 
$0.95. Based on a founder’s initial investment, as disclosed in the forms registered with 
the SEC, we can analyze their potential gains conditional on the successful merger, as 
shown in Figure I.  
 Assuming that the share-conversion ratio during the merger is one, we calculate 
potential gains for SPAC founders in absolute dollar value, depending on changes in the 
stock price and assuming a post-merger warrants’ exercise. On average, SPAC managers 
contribute $3.619 million to the company, either through initial investment or warrant 
purchases.    
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The founders’ contribution represents 2.76% of total funds that a SPAC keeps in its 
escrow accounts. Assuming that the SPAC founders would not buy any additional shares 
later in the process, a simple calculation shows that any post-merger stock price higher 
than $1 means a positive return to the SPAC founders.39 Therefore, the way for managers 
to achieve a positive return is to find an appropriate target and to successfully close the 
merger transaction.  
In the case where the merger does not materialize for any reason and the SPAC is 
liquidated, promoters are neither entitled to any return on their initial investment, nor 
compensated for warrant purchases; consequently, they lose all of their initial investment. 
The failure to find the proper target could impair the reputation of the SPAC promoters 
and vice versa. For example, managers of Chardan China, who successfully executed a 
merger in November 2005, were later able to raise funds for four additional SPACs of 
which three already found proper business combinations. 
3.2 Underwriters 
 The first modern-era SPAC, which completed an IPO in August 2003, created the 
underwriter EarlyBirdCapital.40  The role of the underwriters in the life of SPACs is 
manifold.     
 First, underwriters carefully structure offerings of SPAC securities in order to 
make the SPAC interesting for potential investors. Second, underwriters serve as market-
makers for SPAC units, shares and warrants and determine when they can be traded. 
                                                 
39 The assumption that SPAC founders are not going to buy any additional shares  during the process could 
be questionable due to the so called “yield game”  where for some investors it may be rational to opt  for 
SPAC liquidation instead of approving the business combination 
40 The Millstream Acquisition Corporation is the first SPAC that did an IPO in August 2003, and the first 
one that successfully completed a merger in 2004. 
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Finally, underwriters provide their proprietary knowledge and serve as advisors to the 
parties involved. 
 Out of 161 SPACS that conducted an IPO, all but five followed the same format 
in structuring their offerings by issuing only one class of units. This remaining five 
SPACs, having HFCP/Brenner Securities as their lead underwriter, issued two types of 
units, with two classes of shares and two classes of warrants.41
 A typical SPAC, as shown in Table II, raises $126.4 million in gross proceeds in 
its IPO.42 On average, the underwriter’s fee is 7% of the gross proceeds. The fee is 
divided into 3.94%, which is paid to the underwriters at the moment of the IPO, and 
3.06%, which is deferred and paid conditionally on the successful merger. The deferred 
part of the underwriter’s compensation has a motivational role for underwriters, and at 
the same time, serves as a positive signal to investors. This deferred part of compensation 
aligns the incentives of the underwriters with the incentives of the SPAC founders, with 
respect to the final outcome.  
 Final prospectus forms provide information on the allocation of units to the 
underwriters involved in the issuance process and on the size of the underwriters’ 
syndicate. Table III provides an overview and lists leading underwriters either by the 
number of deals in which they were lead underwriters or members of the syndicate or by 
the average number of units they issued. 
 According to final prospectus reports, 95 underwriters in total took part in the 
SPAC unit issuance process. An average the SPAC that issues 14.85 million units is 
                                                 
41 In the deals underwritten by HCFP, the insiders on average buy only 100 common shares at a total cost 
of $500. They have also purchased a large number of warrants prior to the completion of the IPO 
42 The amount of 126.4 million represents the proceeds raised in the case the underwriter does not exercise 
an over-allotment option. Full exercises of an over-allotment option would increase the amount of gross 
proceeds by 19.9 million on average. 
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being serviced by a syndicate of 3.64 underwriters. Four of the underwriters, either as 
lead or co-lead, were involved in more than 25% of all SPACs that successfully 
conducted an IPO, while one underwriter was involved in 46% of all SPAC IPOs.  
 A high level of syndication was common between 2003 and 2006. The success of 
the first SPACs in finding appropriate targets for merger and an increased demand for 
SPAC securities in the investment community brought large players like Citigroup and 
Deutsche Bank into the market as underwriters and promoters.  
 According to our data, Citigroup is the leading underwriter in terms of the total 
number of SPAC units issued to the public. Panel B shows that five underwriters were 
lead underwriters and promoters in more than 10% of all SPAC IPOs, with Early Bird 
Capital being the lead underwriter for 20% of the SPACs.43 Interestingly, investment 
banks that were participants in underwriting syndicates in more than 20% of the IPOs 
were never leading underwriters alone. We conclude that SPAC underwriting is a 
specialization of few banks and that the average size of an underwriting syndicate is more 
than four times lower than a typical IPO, as reported in Aggarwal (2000).  
 3.3. Investors 
A. Overall characteristics of investors in SPACs 
 On average, investors are, as presented in Table II, buyers of a 78.2% equity stake 
in a SPAC during the IPO. By purchasing SPAC units they provide 97.24% of cash to the 
SPAC. The remaining 2.76% comes from SPAC sponsors through warrant purchases and 
initial investments.  
 Both in registration statements and in the final prospectus, SPAC investors are 
informed about the management of cash proceeds before the IPO. Around 96% of funds 
                                                 
43 EarlyBirdCapital considers SPACs as their trademark 
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raised through the IPO are placed in an escrow account with a well-established financial 
institution. 
 The funds in escrow serve as a downside benchmark for all potential public 
investors in the SPAC and assure them if a proper merger is not found, then about 96% of 
the invested funds would be returned. Depending on the SPAC’s management decision, 
the interest earned on the funds in an escrow account can be used as the working capital 
for the acquisition of related expenses. 
 The establishment of the escrow account is not the only way for public investors 
to protect themselves against the failure to find a merger target. Investors can get back, 
on average, 96% of their investment, even if a merger is announced and agreed upon, just 
by opting for cash conversion of their shares. Between 2003 and2006, if more than 20% 
of public investors opted for share conversion, the merger would be terminated and 
SPAC dissolved, with all funds from the escrow accounts returned to public investors. In 
recent prospectuses, the upper limit on the fraction of converted shares that trigger 
termination of the merger and dissolution of the SPAC is usually 30-35%, and, in some 
cases, even 40%. This increase in the percentage of investors necessary to stop a 
proposed merger is most likely a response by founders of SPACs and underwriters to 
shareholders’ activism. 
 Investors in a SPAC who own 78.2% of shares while contributing 97.24% of the 
capital experience share dilution. In addition to dilution due to the discounted price that 
SPAC founders pay for equity, public investors also might experience dilution due to 
possible cash conversion by investors who disagree with a proposed merger and want to 
opt out of the SPAC.  
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In Figure II, the share dilution is calculated for a typical SPAC in our sample, 
assuming that warrants have no value and that the underwriter did not exercise over-
allotment shares.  
  On average, across the sample new investors realize a share dilution close to 
29.30% if a possible conversion of shares is not accounted for. In the majority of 
prospectuses, SPAC underwriters and sponsors calculate the maximum share dilution that 
could be realized if 20% of investors convert their shares. Considering that a conversion 
of shares would decrease the net tangible book value of the SPAC for 20%, while 
keeping the number of remaining shares constant, our dilution (2) measure shows that a 
maximum share dilution of 43.40% for remaining investors is theoretically possible.  
 After the trading of SPAC securities is established, the primary market investors 
are able to adjust their holdings in secondary markets based on the expectations of future 
payoffs. Given that investors purchase units that are later disbundled into shares and 
options to buy additional shares if a merger occurs, there are many possible strategies for 
investors during the two-year period before a final decision on a merger is made. For 
example, investors who believe in the vision of SPAC founders and are committed for a 
long term, can simply keep their shares and warrants in their portfolios as they anticipate 
post-merger gains. 
B. Incentives of investors in respect to exit 
 SPAC investors have different strategies to maximize their initial investment. 
Figure III shows a possible strategy that would make SPAC investors unwilling to 
proceed with the merger unless they identify value in creating a merger.44 In recent 
                                                 
44 The T-bill rate used in figure III to calculate potential yields represents the prevailing rate in 2007 and 
2008. 
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SPAC offerings, it is common that almost 100% of gross proceeds are placed in escrow 
accounts. This feature enables certain investors to play a so-called “yield game” by 
immediately selling warrant securities and opting to convert shares into cash at the 
moment of merger.  As shown in Figure III, the investors could realize positive returns of 
around 7% by applying a similar strategy. Obtained returns to yield players are positively 
related to the willingness of SPAC managers, underwriters, or third party investors to 
proceed with the deal. This potential strategy is well known to SPAC promoters and 
underwriters, who are essentially forced to keep track of the identity of investors, as well 
as their opinions about proxy voting to approve the merger.45
                                        
Assuming that the SPAC investor is a leveraged hedge fund with a leverage of 5 to 1 
and an initial investment of $160,000 of its own funds, we calculate a potential total 
return of 78% over the life of the SPAC.  The return could be higher if SPAC sponsors 
are forced to buy shares above trust/per share value in order to secure enough votes to 
approve the merger. 
The uncertainty about merger success caused by the conflicting interests of SPAC 
founders and investors was the leading reason for changes in the percentage of investors 
that can veto the merger.46  In the most recent SPACs that conducted an IPO, the 
percentage of investors that could veto mergers was as high as 40%.  
 
                                                 
45 In an attempt to increase support for the merger, SPAC promoters in their proxy statements before the 
vote said this:  “Prior to exercising conversion rights, shareholders should verify the market price of 
common stock, as they may receive higher proceeds from the sale of their common stock in the public 
market than from exercising their conversion rights.”   
                                        
46 If investors buy shares when they trade below the net asset value, it could be in their best interest to reject 
the deal. Some investors could be interested only in short term profits, which is not necessarily in the best 
interest of the SPAC. 
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4.   SPAC performance 
 In this section, we describe important events in the life of SPACs, such as the 
IPO, the merger announcement, and the merger itself. In addition, we analyze the 
performance of the SPAC securities. 
4.1 The IPO 
A. Filing statistics 
 
 In Table III, the characteristics of 161 SPACS that conducted an IPO are 
presented as they are in the final prospectus forms. On average, at the IPO, SPACs issue 
14.85 units at an average price of $7.84.47 The average gross proceeds before the 
underwriter’s decision to exercise an overallotment option are $126.40 million, out of 
which $119 million is placed in an escrow account. This represents about 95% of the 
gross proceeds on average, and does not show any change with respect to the preliminary 
prospectus. On average, the underwriter’s fee is 7% of the gross proceeds; the fee is 
divided into 3.94% paid at the moment of IPO, and the rest of the 3.06% is deferred and 
paid conditionally on a successful merger. On average, SPAC managers purchase 3.75 
million warrants at a price of $0.95, and place them into an escrow account. 
 Table I also presents the summary statistics based on information presented in the 
423B-3 forms of all 161 SPACs, with the sample divided into two sub-samples. The first 
sub-sample covers time the period between from January 2003 and April 2006, and the 
second sub-sample covers the period between April 2006 and July 2009. There are two 
reasons for doing this. First, it allows us to see the changes in the SPAC structure over 
                                                 
47 The majority of the units are structured as one share plus one warrant. To buy one additional share, the 
average unit has one share and one warrant which provides an option to buy 1.28 shares. There are 10 unit 
offerings in which a warrant is buying less than 1 share in the future date. 
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time, such as the increase in the average IPO size, the decrease in the number of shares 
that warrants can buy, and the increase in the deferred compensation to underwriters. 
Second, it divides the sample at the point where Jog and Sun (2007) completed their 
observation of the process. 
 Comparing the two periods, SPAC founders on average offered 106.00% (18.34 
vs. 8.90) more units in the later period, and sold units at 22% higher a price (8.40 vs. 
6.89), which typically led to a 147% increase in gross proceeds from the first to the 
second period, and implies an overall stronger interest in the investment community for 
SPACs. The increase in gross proceeds is accompanied by an increase in the ratio of the 
proceeds being placed in the escrow accounts from 91.20% in the first period to 98.00% 
in the second period. This can be explained by the increased amount of commission that 
underwriters deferred (0.03% of gross proceeds in the first period versus 3.20% in the 
second period), as well as an increase in the amount of funds that the original SPAC 
founders invested by buying warrants.  
 While underwriters’ total commission was around 7% in both periods, we can see 
a decrease in the percentage that underwriters charged immediately after the IPO, from 
7.37% of gross proceeds in the first period to 3.20% in the second period, with the 
remaining compensation being tied to the success of the proposed merger. By comparing 
two periods, we can see an increased commitment on the side of the SPAC sponsors 
through the purchase of warrants. On average, in the first period they purchased 1.85 
million warrants and in the second period they purchased 4.19 million warrants. 
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 B.   Underwriters’ option to purchase additional units after the IPO 
 The first form that SPAC founders file with the SEC after the successful IPO is 
the 8-K form48. In this form, they report what date the IPO deal was consummated as 
well as information on additional unit purchases by underwriters due to oversubscription. 
On average, the underwriters are allotted 2.29 million of additional units to distribute. 
From our sample of 161 SPACs, the underwriters of 110 SPACs used that right and 
bought an average of 1.80 million additional units, using around 84% of their total 
allotment. Among the deals in which the overallotment option was used, 65 underwriters 
exercised that option completely.   
 Aggarwal (2000) believes that in regular IPOs, underwriters strategically set up 
their offerings and use a short covering strategy in order to support the share price in the 
aftermarket. In the case of SPACs, the price support does not drive underwriters’ 
behavior due to the pre-fixed offering price of securities and the low liquidity after the 
IPO. 
4.2 Performance of SPACs at the IPO 
A. IPO day 
 Academic literature on the pricing of securities around IPO events is abundant. 
The majority of evidence shows that issued shares exhibit above market returns during 
their first trading day. Ljungqvist (2007) compiles the literature on underpricing and 
shows that the phenomena could be explained either by asymmetric information models, 
                                                 
48 Form 8-K reports certain material corporate events on a more current basis, and must be filed with the 
SEC to announce changes that shareholders must be aware of. Companies usually have 4 days to notify the 
SEC of the event. From the SEC’s point of view as long as SPACS file the 8-k form and audited financial 
statement which shows that net assets are in the excess of $5 million, they will not be considered as blank 
checks subject to rule 419. 
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institutional theory models, or behavioral theories. We believe that none of those 
explanations are applicable to SPAC offerings. The firmly set structure of the SPACs 
substantially before the IPO date, the establishment of the escrow accounts where almost 
all proceeds are placed, in addition to zero uncertainty about the offered unit price, create 
no incentives for new investors to enter into significant speculations on the first day of 
trading.   
 Sun and Jung (2007) calculate underpricing of SPACs at the moment of the IPO 
using the following formula:  
                    Underpricing = (P1- P0 )/ P0  
 
where P1 represents the closing unit price at the end of the first trading day and P0   
represents the original unit price as announced in the SPACs’ prospectuses. In our data 
consisting of 111 SPACs with information on unit prices, we have first day trading 
information for 107. We calculate underpricing in the same manner as Sun and Jog 
(2007). In Panel A of Table IV, we present descriptive statistics of returns. Panel B shows 
that the overall mean of first-day underpricing is 0.0001%. This is lower than the 
underpricing reported by Sun and Jog of 0.38%, but the result is highly expected and the 
relatively high average trading volume of 2.2 million units supports the hypothesis that 
investors in SPACs have no incentives to diverge from the offering unit price on the first 
trading day. 
 B. Performance of SPACs’ securities around the announcement of the merger 
 Previous findings in literature on SPACs’ performance around the announcement 
of merger date are scarce, not uniform, and mostly address the performance of SPACs’ 
common shares. We believe that more insights on merger announcements can be 
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obtained if we simultaneously analyze the performance of all three types of securities that 
SPACs issue during the IPO, namely units, common stocks, and warrants. In order to 
examine the behavior of these securities we form three samples with daily returns for 
three distinguished SPAC securities.  
 Results are obtained for abnormal returns based on the market model from Brown 
and Warner (1985), 
                                      Rjt = αj + βjRmt + εjt 
where Rjt is the rate of return of the jth SPAC security on the merger announcement day 
t, and Rmt is the rate of return of an equally weighted daily market index on day t 
downloaded from CRSP. Then the abnormal return for the SPAC securities on merger 
announcement day t is 
                                   ARjt = Rjt - (α0j + β0jRmt) 
where α0  and β0 are ordinary least squares estimates of α and β. The parameter 
estimation period is 50 days prior to the first day of the 11-day event period. In addition 
to the calculation of abnormal returns around the announcement day, we calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns up to seven days after the event. 
 Out of 161 SPACs that successfully conducted an IPO since 2003, we have 
complete stock price information around the announcement date for 88. The absence of 
stock price information on the remaining SPACs occurred for the following reasons. 
Neither CRSP, Bloomberg nor Reuters provided stock price information for the 12 
SPACs around the announcement date. In addition, we excluded from the sample five 
SPACs that were issuing dual shares and pricing them differently. The rest of the SPACs 
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are not in the sample because either their merger announcement date is after January 
2009 or because they did not announce an intent to conduct a merger at all. 
 In Table V, Panel A we report that abnormal returns on SPACs’ common stock on 
the announcement day is 0.85%. When abnormal returns are calculated over the two-day 
period, which includes the announcement date and the day after, SPAC common shares 
exhibit positive abnormal return of 1.2%. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns up to 
seven days after the announcement and report in Panel B that after the first post-
announcement day, returns monotonically decline to 0.047% seven days after the 
announcement. As expected, the SPAC common shares do not exhibit abnormal 
performance in the seven day period after the merger announcement. This is primarily 
due to the fact that SPAC common shareholders can redeem their shares at pro rata value 
of deposited funds in the escrow accounts independently of the merger outcome, and 
therefore, they do not have much incentive to bid up the price higher at the announcement 
date.   
 In Panel A of Table VI we report abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement days to unit holders. The data on the unit daily prices comes from 
Bloomberg and Reuters, and we have complete information for 48 SPACs around the 
merger announcement date. Since a unit is composed of SPACs’ common shares and 
additional warrants that are exercisable only after successful merger combination, it is 
interesting to observe the behavior of unit holders around the announcement of a merger. 
For 48 SPACs that have information on unit prices, an average unit consists of one share 
and 1.134 warrants. 
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 On the day of the announcement, unit holders experience a 2.42% positive 
abnormal return. When an abnormal return is calculated for the two-day period, which 
includes the announcement date and the day after, the abnormal return is 3.43%. When 
we calculate cumulative abnormal returns for up to seven days after the announcement, 
we see that the total cumulative return for unit holders is 7.88%. This finding is 
interesting and, based on a reported lack of significant overperformance of SPAC 
common shares around the merger announcement, leads us to conclude that unit 
abnormal returns are largely driven by performance of warrants.  
 Finally, we examine the behavior of SPAC warrants around the merger 
announcement date. The data on warrant prices is the hardest to obtain primarily because 
historical warrant prices are not kept on record once warrants are exercised, and in some 
cases are not reported at all. Data is easier to obtain for SPACs that conducted their IPO 
in the last two years. Although we have collected data for daily warrant prices on 80 
SPACs from the sample, the data needed to thoroughly estimate returns around the 
merger announcement date is available for only 24.  
     Warrant holders experience significant abnormal returns on the day of the 
announcement and these returns are reported as 11.11% in Panel A of Table VII. Similar 
performance is observed on the first day after the announcement where we see an 
additional 4.20% abnormal return. Interestingly, this strong positive reaction lasts only 
for these two days and on the second day after the announcement, abnormal returns 
became negative, leading to a cumulative abnormal return of 6.6% seven trading days 
after the announcement. A positive reaction of warrant prices after the merger 
announcement is expected. 
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C. Performance of SPAC securities around the merger 
 Mergers are the desired final outcome for SPACs.  It should be a natural outcome 
that mergers create value for all the participants. We test behavior of SPAC securities 
around the merger date and in Table VIII Panel A, we report results for equity 
performance. We have daily stock returns on and around the merger dates for 48 SPACs 
that completed mergers. SPAC equity holders experience a negative 3.81% return on the 
day of merger completion. On any post-merger day, up to seven days after the merger, 
SPAC equity holders experience a negative abnormal return. Panel A reports the 
cumulative abnormal return for the seven days after the event as -9.59%. This finding is 
interesting, but not unexpected since the merger date is determined in advance when the 
merger is approved by shareholders. It might also be due to premium prices that parties in 
favor of the merger were paying for shares before the voting day. 
 In Panel B we present results on abnormal returns for warrants on and around the 
merger date. Only eight companies have available data. On the merger day, warrant 
holders earn a 4.76% abnormal return, while the cumulative return for seven days after 
the merger is 7.36%. 
D.  Overall Performance of SPAC securities 
 In Table IX we show the buy and hold performance for three SPAC subsamples 
based on their merger status. Panel A of Table IX includes SPAC companies that 
completed a merger. We calculate the buy and hold return for a hypothetical investor who 
bought one SPAC unit on the IPO date and was holding that unit until the last week of 
June 2009. There are 66 companies with available data in the first subsample and the 
average buy and hold unit return for each is -28.69%. SPACs that successfully completed 
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a merger offered on average 7.33 units for sale at the IPO; their unit consisted of 1.43 
warrants and their average size calculated by the dollar amount of IPO proceeds was 
$98.875 million. This finding is interesting primarily because the first SPAC shareholders 
initially had the power to veto the merger, and as a result of not exercising this power at 
that moment, they tended to engage in value-destroying activities.   
 Panel B of Table IX presents the characteristics of the second subsample, which 
consists of companies that already announced a merger but currently are in the process of 
approval.  There are 16 companies with available data and on average they exhibit a 9.6% 
positive buy and hold unit return from the IPO date until the last week of June. On 
average, these SPACs are larger than SPACs that already completed mergers ($177 
million vs. $98 million), have fewer warrants per unit (1.25 vs. 1.43) their units are 
offered at the higher price at the time of IPO (8.5 vs. 7.33), and they have a higher 
percentage of gross proceeds deposited into the escrow accounts (98.6% vs. 93.3%). Two 
potential explanations for why unit investors in this subsample experience positive 
returns are as follows. First, investors are willing to bid up the price of either shares or 
warrants, assigning a high probability for value-creating transactions. Second, SPAC 
founders and underwriters under pressure to complete the merger are buying out original 
SPAC investors at prices higher than the original value.49
 In Panel C of Table IX, we calculate buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that 
conducted an IPO but are still seeking a merger as of the last week of June 2009. The 
subsample consists of 23 companies that on average raised $233 million at the IPO and 
whose warrant consists of 0.97 units. As of the last week of June they experienced -
                                                 
49 The limited data we have points to the second possibility 
 53
8.22% returns.  Panels D and E show some characteristics of SPACs that liquidated and 
the whole sample, respectively. 
4.3 Merger determinants 
 Although the approval of the merger is fully in the hands of a qualifying 
percentage of investors during the merger voting process, we try to examine the 
possibility that additional SPAC characteristics could impact the success of the merger. 
 By analyzing available data on 161 SPACs that completed an IPO and applying 
probit estimation procedures, we test the likelihood of the merger success on the set of 
SPAC characteristics: 
                  Merger success = f (Set of SPACs characteristics) 
where SPAC characteristics are the gross amount of IPO proceeds, the number of 
warrants in unit, the unit price at IPO date, the percentage of funds deposited in the 
escrow accounts, the underwriter’s name, the size of the underwriter’s syndicate, and the 
share dilution.  
As reported in Table X, the likelihood of a successful merger for SPACs increases 
with respect to the unit offer price, number of warrants per unit, and the presence of 
EarlyBirdCapital (EBCAP) as the lead underwriter. The likelihood of a merger decreases 
with respect to an increase in the size of the offering and the percentage of funds 
deposited in escrow accounts. 
5. Conclusion: 
 We examine the characteristics of SPACs and the performance of the securities 
they issue, namely, units, common stocks and warrants, at important dates of their limited 
corporate life. Our analysis shows that SPACs have a complex corporate structure in 
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which the incentives of the founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and 
where successful mergers result in significant returns to the founders.  
 We also show that different SPAC securities do not exhibit similar reactions in 
response to announcements regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three 
securities realize positive abnormal returns on the merger announcement day, the 
strongest reaction is observed among the investors holding warrants, while common stock 
holders react very mildly. This is an expected outcome bearing in mind the way SPACs 
were originally structured. 
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              Figure 1. The financing of maturing debt under the pecking order theory 
 
The figure presents the theoretical relationship between the amount of maturing debt, R, 
and the amount of new long-term debt issued, DISR, under the pecking order theory and 
in the absence of debt capacity constraints. 
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  Figure 2. The financing of maturing debt 
 
Each dot on this scatter plot represents one observation in our sample, linking the amount 
of maturing debt and new debt issuance. 
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  Figure 3. The financing of maturing debt 
 
Each dot on this scatter plot represents one observation in our sample, linking the amount 
of maturing debt and new equity issuance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58
 59
  Essay 1  
Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample period from 1971 to 2006. Maturing long-term debt is 
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Net equity issued is equity issued 
(data108) minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term 
debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 
44), all scaled by lagged total assets. Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Cash is 
cash and short-term investments (data1) scaled by assets. Rated is an indicator set to one for  which  
the firm has a rating (data280). Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level 
are marked * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Variable 
 
mean 
 
median 
 
min 
 
max 
 
Maturing long-term debt, R 
 
0.033 
 
0.016 
 
0.001 
 
0.993 
Net equity issued, NEIS 0.045 0.000 -0.143 2.013 
Net long-term debt issued, NDISR 0.052 0.011 -0.323 1.322 
Financing deficit, DEF 0.096 0.023 -0.421 3.192 
Cash 0.096 0.047 0 0.993 
Rated 0.243 0 0 1 
Sales (millions of dollars) 1,029 92 1 328,213 
Maturing long-term debt / net long-term debt 
issued 
  
0.489 
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Table 2 
Pecking order tests 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued 
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time 
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. 
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) 
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt 
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), 
all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a 
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2  is the R2  of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported 
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, 
respectively. 
 
 
Net debt issued Net debt issued 
 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
Intercept 0.016** 6.3 -0.016** -3.6 
Financing deficit 0.427** 6.2 (-8.4) 
Maturing long-term debt 1.035** 37.9 (1.3) 
 
Pooled R2 0.326 0.160 
 
Observations 113,768 113,768 
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  Table 3 
Pecking order tests by firm size quartiles 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years 
(1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics.  The t-statistics for 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity 
issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance 
(data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is 
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Quartile 1 (4) contains the quarter of the sample firms that are the smallest (largest) in terms of 
sales. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% 
and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
Panel A. 
 
Intercept 0.026** 7.1 0.015** 5.3 0.003 1.8 0.004** 3.4 
Financing deficit 0.333** 4.2 (-8.5) 0.450** 6.2 (-7.6) 0.701** 17.9 (-7.6) 0.785** 54.3 (-14.9) 
 
Pooled R2 0.213 0.310 0.622 0.799 
 
Observations 26,758 27,977 28,547 30,486 
 
Panel B. 
 
Intercept -0.028** -5.5 -0.025** -4.6 -0.013** -2.6 0.000 0.1 
Maturing long-term debt 1.110** 27.1 (2.1) 1.043** 39.7 (1.6) 0.996** 42.8 (-0.2) 0.889** 18.5 (-2.3) 
Pooled R2 0.198 0.142 0.118 0.095 
Observations 26,758 27,977 28,547 30,486 
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Pecking order tests by access to public debt market 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued 
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time 
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. 
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) 
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt 
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), 
all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a 
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2  is the R2  of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported 
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, 
respectively. 
 
 
Without credit rating With credit rating 
 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
 
Panel A.  
 
Intercept 
Financing deficit 
 
0.023** 
0.273** 
 
9.0 
11.2 (-29.8) 
 
0.005** 
0.816** 
 
2.6 
19.0 (-4.3) 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.247  0.798  
 
Observations 48,897 15,961 
 
Panel B.     
 
Intercept 
Maturing long-term debt 
 
-0.032** 
1.076** 
 
-6.7 
39.1 (2.8) 
 
-0.006 
0.913** 
 
-1.8 
29.3 (-2.8) 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.206  
 
0.118  
Observations 48,897  15,961  
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Table 5 
Pecking order tests by period 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued 
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time 
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. 
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) 
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt 
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), 
all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a 
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2  is the R2  of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported 
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, 
respectively. 
 
 
1971-1989 1990-2006 
 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
 
Panel A.  
 
Intercept 
Financing deficit 
 
0.012** 
0.545** 
 
4.1 
5.8 (-4.9) 
 
0.022** 
0.279** 
 
7.3 
9.2 (-23.9) 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.429  0.258  
 
Observations 65,373 48,395 
 
Panel B.     
 
Intercept 
Maturing long-term debt 
 
-0.007* 
1.006** 
 
-2.0 
25.0 (0.2) 
 
-0.027** 
1.071** 
 
-5.3 
43.5 (2.9) 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.107  
 
0.217  
Observations 65,373  48,395  
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Intercept 0.014* 2.4 0.009 1.8 -0.005 -1.1 0.005 0.5 
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Table 6 
Pecking order tests by cash quartiles 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The 
table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) minus equity repurchased 
(data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in 
one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Quartile 1 (4) 
contains the quarter of the sample firms with the lowest (highest) values of cash (data 1) as a fraction of total assets. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series 
cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Pooled R2 0.225 0.181 0.145 0.079 
Pooled R2 0.126 0.100 0.081 0.034 
 
Panel A: Net debt issued 
 
Intercept -0.001 -0.2 -0.004 -1.0 -0.017** -4.0 -0.048** -7.8 
Maturing long-term debt 0.994** 24.3 (-0.2) 0.976** 30.9 (-0.8) 1.079** 38.7 (2.8) 1.141** 20.2 (2.5) 
Maturing long-term debt 1.158** 16.9 (2.3) 1.148** 18.2 (2.4) 1.368** 19.6 (5.3) 1.409** 15.4 (4.5) 
Observations 28,288 28,911 28,079 28,357 
Observations 28,288 28,911 28,079 28,357 
Panel B: Net debt and net equity issued 
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Table 7 
Pecking order tests by LTD*-LTD quartiles 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years 
(1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. Net debt issued is 
long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets. 
Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. LTD*-LTD is the difference between the predicted and the actual 
leverage ratios. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero 
at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively.  The t-statistics for the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
LTD*-LTD Quartile 1 LTD*-LTD Quartile 2 LTD*-LTD Quartile 3 LTD*-LTD Quartile 4 
 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.014* 
 
-2.4 
 
-0.012* 
 
-2.4 
 
-0.016* 
 
-2.9 
 
-0.028** 
 
-6.7 
Maturing long-term debt 0.955** 27.2 (-1.3) 1.034** 28.6 (0.9) 1.134** 22.5 (2.7) 1.480** 14.8 (4.8) 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.329  
 
0.093  
 
0.047  
 
0.024  
Observations 20,210  20,613  20,587  20,523  
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Table 8 
Pecking order tests: Regression 
results 
 
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt 
issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means 
of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. 
Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus 
lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets.  Maturing long-term debt is 
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Cash is cash and short-term 
investments (data 1) as a fraction of total assets. LTD*-LTD is the difference between the predicted and 
the actual leverage ratios. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the 
reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are 
marked * and **, respectively.  The t-statistic for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient on maturing 
debt is equal to one is reported in parentheses. 
 
 
  Coeff. 
 
t-stat. 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.8 
Cash -0.135** -7.3 
LTD*-LTD 0.004 0.3 
Maturing long-term debt 1.037** 40.5 (1.5) 
Maturing long-term debt × Cash 0.384 1.6 
Maturing long-term debt × (LTD*-LTD) 0.355* 2.5 
 
Pooled R2 
 
0.166  
Observations 81,925  
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Figure I :The  Incentives to SPAC founders 
 
The analysis of potential value attainable to the SPAC founders for the average company 
in our sample 
 
 Value in $ Value in $ million Percentage 
Offering size (IPO Gross proceeds + over allotment)           131.00  
Sponsors equity investment – (4.16 million shares)              0.057  
Sponsors warrant purchase – 3.75 millions  ($0.95)             3.562  
Total capital at risk by managers                                          3.619  
Managers investment as percentage of offering proceeds      2.76 
Warrant exercise price                                                          6.00   
Share conversion ratio                                                         1    
  
 
Price of shares ($)        1.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Number of shares (m)  4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16
 
Value of shares ($mil)    4.16 16.64 20.80 24.96 29.02 32.28 37.44 41.60
 
Num. of warrants(mil) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
 
Value of warrants(mil) 0 0 0 0 3.75 7.50 11.25 15.00
 
Total value of securit. 4.16 16.64 20.80 24.96 32.77 40.78 48.69 56.60
 
Total capital at risk 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.61
 
Total return ($ mil)       0.54 13.02 17.18 21.24 29.15 37.16 45.07 52.98
 
Return on invest. (%)   14.90 359.00 474.00 586.00 805.00 1026.00 126.03 1463.00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67
 68
Essay 2 
Figure II : The Incentives to SPAC investors 
 
The average investments by founders and investors are calculated, as well as the dilution 
to investors  
 
 
 Shares purchased      Total investment          Avg. price per share
 Number(m) Percentage Value in $ Percentage  In $ 
SPAC Promoters 4.16 21.00 0.057 0.05 0.013 
New investors 14.85 79.00 109.757 99.05 7.84 
Total 19.01 100.00 109.814 100.00 0.159 
Dilution Calculations:     
        Value in $    Percentage 
Public offering price   7.84   
Amnt. of funds in escrow   105.42(mill)   
Total number of shares         19.01 (mill)   
Escrow/number of shares     5.54   
Dilution (1)                            29.30  
Amnt. when 20% convert     84.33(mill)   
New Escrow/# of shares       4.43   
Dilution (2)                            43.34  
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Figure III : Possible trading strategy 
 
An example of possible trading strategy by investors, assuming that warrants can be sold 
at the price of $1 in the market anytime before the merger. 
 
 
Deal Characteristics   Trade by investor  
Unit price                     ( $   )  8.00 Unit price 8.00 
Number of units sold   (mill)             25.00 Warrant sale pr. 1.00 
Total proceeds             (mill)             200.00 Remaining 7.00 
Amount of funds in trust (%)         99.00   
Dollar amount in trust  (mill)        198.00   
T-bill interest rate         ( % )            3.00   
Effective tax rate           ( %)            30.00   
$ amount in trust after 2yrs      206.43   
Value per share  in trust( % )            8.25   
Investors gain (Value per.sh-remaining)  1.25   
Annual return ( Investors gain/ Unit pr)  7.50   
Leverage ratio  5.00   
Initial investor’s investment ( $ thous.)  160.00   
Total investment  ( $ thous.)  800.00   
Gain per share (Value in trust- remain)  1.25   
Total return over two years (%)  78.00   
Compounding annual return  (%)  33.00   
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Table I :   
Chronological overview of SPAC activity in the 2003-2009 period 
 
Chronological overview of SPAC activity in the 2003-2009 period where their corporate status is presented 
year by year 
 
Year 
Number  of SPACs that 
completed  IPO’s    
Number of SPACs that 
completed merger    
Number of  SPACs 
that liquidated    
Number of SPACs 
seeking for merger 
2003 1 0 0 0 
2004 12 1 0 0 
2005 27 3 0 0 
2006 38 11 4 0 
2007 66 27 21 20 
2008 17 21 27 21 
2009 0 8 13 0 
Total: 161 71 49 41 
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Table II: 
Characteristics of SPACs as on 423B Forms 
 
The table presents the characteristics of 161 SPACs that conducted the IPO as in their final prospectus 
forms. Where: Units= number of units issued, Price = price of units at IPO, ST=number of shares, 
SM=management shares, PO=percentage ownership by investors, GP=Gross Proceeds, NP=Net Proceeds, 
ESC=value of shares in the escrow account, MI=Management investment in SPAC,UDC=Underwriters 
compensation, UDDC=Underwriters Deferred compensation, Warr=number of warrants bought by insiders, 
Wp=price of warrants, UUG=over allotment units granted, Unless noted by * next to variable, all values are 
in $ millions 
 
 
Variables Complete sample            Period 2003-April 2006   Period April 2006- Jul 2009
 
Year     Mean       Max         Min        Mean      Max     Min       Mean       Max     Min    
Units (million)    14.85 90.00 0.75 8.90 28.50 0.75 18.34 90.00 2.50 
 
Units price at IPO     7.84 10.00 6.00 6.89 10.00 6.00 8.40 10.00 8.00 
 
ST(total # shares) 19.01 112.50 1.55 11.53 35.62 1.55 23.26 112.5 3.75 
 
SM(# Manag. Sh) 4.16 25.87 0.25 2.62 15.00 0.25 18.20 25.87 0.75 
 
PO(Investor. Sh %) 80.00 81.00 78.70 79.00 82.00 74.00 79.90 81.00 78.90 
 
Gross Proc. ($ mill) 126.40 900.00 9.05 60.46 188.70 6.56 165.90 900.00 16.50 
 
Manag. Investment 0.057 0.005 2.525 0.023 2.00 0.001 0.086 0.02 2.525
 
ESC 7.84 8.90 3.90 6.36 9.10 4.48 8.60 9.82 5.00 
 
UDC (%) 7.00 20.00 1.00 7.40 20.00 4.00 6.40 9.00 1.00 
 
UDDC(%) 3.06 5.40 0.00 0.03 3.00 0.00 3.80 1.00 5.40 
 
Warrants (# mill.)    3.75 16.00 0.00 1.85 5.00 0.00 4.19 16.00 0.90 
 
Warrant price($)      0.95 1.50 0.00 0.87 1.50 0.00 0.97 1.50 0.45 
 
UUG (#units)           2.29 13.50 0.31 1.38 4.27 0.31 2.79 13.50 0.45 
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Table III 
Underwriters involvement in SPAC deals 
 
The table presents underwriter characteristics over the sample of 161 IPO’s in the 2003-2009 period. In the 
Panel A summary statistics on the number of underwriters per deal and number of units per deal is 
presented. In Panel B 12 underwriters are ranked by the number of SPAC IPOs in which they were 
involved. 
 
      #deals  Mean Min  Max 
Panel A:     
Number of SPAC IPOs 161    
Number of underwriters involved  95   
Amount of units issued    14.85 0.75 90 
Number of Underwriters per IPO  3.64 1 12 
     
     
Panel B: 
(Leading SPAC underwriters)     
 #deals involved Lead underwriter Mean (#units) Max (#units) 
Maxim Group 74 19 2.21 22.50 
Ladenburg Thalmann 45 17 3.83 16.825 
Early Bird Capital 42 31 3.64 7.00 
Legend Merchant 40 0 0.37 1.2 
Gunn Allen Financial 36 0 0.63 3.75 
I-bankers 32 1 0.89 2.00 
Morgan Joseph 20 16 6.36 16.02 
Citigroup 18 18 24.42 80.00 
Broadband 16 3 1.47 4.00 
Ramius 14 2 3.45 8.33 
Lazard 13 9 6.77 22.74 
Deutch Bank 12 10 20.90 36.00 
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TABLE IV:   
 
Summary statistics and IPO underpricing 
 
In Panel A daily returns data on SPAC securities obtained from CRSP, Bloomberg and Reuters is 
summarized. In Panel B, underpricing of units is calculated on the day of IPO by formula Underpricing = 
(P1- P0 )/ P0  where P1 represents closing unit price at the end of the first trading day and  P0   represents the 
original unit price as announced in the SPACs’ prospectuses. 
 
 
PANEL A: 
Returns statistics:  
 
Variable                          Number        Mean        Std. Deviation      Minimum          Maximum 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
CRSP data stocks price        45197 7.065 2.700 0.02 30.80 
Returns   45130 -0.0007 0.04 -0.06 1.33 
SP500 RET (from CRSP)     45243 -0.00075 0.02 -0.09 0.11 
Bloomberg data stocks pr.    27363 5.67 2.54 0.001 15.20 
Original Unit offer price           161 7.87 1.54 6.00 10.10 
Trading price for units          31495 7.80 2.87 0.0001 45.80 
Warrants per units at IPO         161 1.31 0.47 0.50 2.00 
Warrants excer.prc at IPO        161 5.90 0.95 4.50 8.00 
Trading price of warrants      31767 0.59 0.67 0.00 6.40 
 
 
 
 
PANEL B: 
 
Underpricing at the IPO                       Number        Mean        Std. Deviation      Minimum       Maximum 
 
Unit open price 1st day                107 7.966 1.60 5.60 11.05 
Unit close price 1st day               107 7.962 1.58 5.77 10.65 
Underpricing 1st day                   107 0.0001 0.052 -0.231 0.33 
Unit Volume 1st day                    90 2208047 3086264.84     200 16813700.0 
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Table V: 
Returns for SPACs common stock holders around the merger announcement day 
 
Panel A presents  abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B 
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate 
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is graphical presentation of the results obtained in Panels A and B. 
 
Panel A: SPAC Stock Returns around the merger announcement date: 
Announcement date stock  abnormal returns: 
       Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Return        0.0105292 0.0309743   -0.0818182   0.1523178 
Alpha           0.0015893   0.0053485   -0.0065305   0.0318480 
Beta 0.1491343   1.3783496   -5.5826787   10.8151338 
Abnormal return     0.0085756   0.0310120   -0.0770958   0.1521550 
        
 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 10 days after announcement date) 
       Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Car 1 0.0130111   0.0526251   -0.0872362   0.3570612 
Car 2       0.0127385   0.0609731   -0.2296609   0.3489474 
Car 3 0.0123245   0.0679592   -0.2549082   0.4174220 
Car 4 0.0096026   0.0722733   -0.3031013   0.3743839 
Car 5   0.0072508   0.0739745   -0.3857526   0.3076525 
Car 6  0.0048525   0.0757266   -0.4282087   0.2595993 
Car 7 0.0004777   0.0920902   -0.5552372   0.3082256 
Car 10 -0.0025637   0.1139913   -0.5888435   0.4378687 
 
Panel C: Graphical representation of announcement and cumulative  returns: 
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Table VI: 
 
Returns for SPAC unit holders around the merger announcement day 
 
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B  
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate 
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is a graphical presentation of  results obtained in Panels A and B. 
Panel A: SPAC Units Returns around the merger announcement date: 
 
Announcement date unit abnormal returns: 
Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Return        0.0201213   0.0369744   -0.0816062   0.1606154 
Alpha           -0.0061846 0.0646209   -0.4519244   0.0202665 
Beta 0.2214427   1.4714179   -5.7847016   7.2536888 
Abnormal return     0.0242951   0.0584504   -0.0730680   0.3506924 
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 days after announcement date) 
Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Car 1 0.0343930   0.1214649   -0.1104080   0.8063082 
Car 2       0.0456363   0.2035615   -0.1708533   1.3982602 
Car 3 0.0472249   0.2629527   -0.2089938   1.8181650 
Car 4 0.0544885   0.3196409   -0.2418225   2.2132872 
Car 5   0.0589535   0.3926259   -0.1794673   2.7294429 
Car 6  0.0658968   0.4531131   -0.2005421   3.1477479 
Car 7 0.0788217   0.5188870   -0.1777621   3.6114892 
 
Panel C: Graphical representation of announcement and cumulative returns to unit holders 
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Table VII: 
Returns for SPAC warrant holders around the merger announcement 
 
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B 
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate 
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is graphical presentation of the results obtained in Panels A and B. 
 
Panel A: SPAC Warrants Returns around the merger announcement date: 
 
Announcement date unit abnormal returns: 
Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Return        0.1235652   0.1988161   -0.1304348   0.6721311 
Alpha           0.0027198   0.0141125   -0.0151523   0.0553368   
Beta 1.5358577   4.1435663   -1.2398772   15.8324139 
Abnormal return     0.1119899   0.2025111   -0.1203337   0.6824944 
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after announcement date) 
 
Variable                             Mean              Std.Dev             Min                  Max 
Car 1 0.1539946   0.3590699   -0.7523790   0.9322721 
Car 2       0.0983182   0.3614209   -0.7523790   0.9258369 
Car 3 0.0866005   0.3478715   -0.4115571   0.9321125 
Car 4 0.0795737   0.3825961   -0.4882695   0.8281739 
Car 5   0.0604376   0.3701326   -0.4652856   0.8281739 
Car 6  0.0629939   0.3292217   -0.4698862   0.7278656 
Car 7 0.0660083   0.4048455   -0.5371966   0.9335521 
 
Panel C: Graphical representation of returns to warrant holders : 
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Table VIII: 
 
Performance of SPAC securities around merger date 
 
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the merger day calculated by the market model. Panel B  presents 
abnormal returns for warrant holders on the merger date.  
 
Panel A: SPAC Stock Returns at the date of merger  
 
Merger date stock abnormal returns: 
 
               Variable                                            Mean               Std.Dev                   Min                       Max 
Return        -0.0348308   0.1097691   -0.6919786   0.0603670 
Alpha           0.0015059   0.0047870   -0.0055783   0.0309012 
Beta 0.2217319   0.3483728   -0.4435740   1.1373777 
Abnormal return     -0.0381030   0.1126252   -0.7141556   0.0593627 
 
  
 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after merger date)  
       Variable                                             Mean              Std.Dev                     Min                  Max 
Car 1 -0.0535390   0.1336298   -0.7222378   0.1062514 
Car 2       -0.0601064   0.1377891   -0.7263495   0.1045851 
Car 3 -0.0626848   0.1499950   -0.8128626   0.1146014 
Car 4 -0.0639884   0.1341806   -0.7339440   0.1150086 
Car 5   -0.0700704   0.1521769   -0.8423757   0.1337219 
Car 6  -0.0868577   0.1697321   -0.8993613   0.1267303 
Car 7 -0.0959149   0.1899362   -0.9794888   0.1143827 
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 Panel B: Merger date warrant abnormal returns    
 
    
Merger date unit abnormal returns: 
Variable                                                           Mean               Std.Dev                   Min                     Max 
Return        0.0610620   0.0983477   -0.0655738   0.1941392 
Alpha           0.0012992   0.0058442   -0.0064705   0.0103035 
Beta 0.5931283   0.8500657   -0.5900071   2.0736777 
Abnormal return     0.0476056   0.0842983   -0.0601677   0.1413110 
 
     
Cumulative unit abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after merger date) 
 
      Variable                                                      Mean              Std.Dev                  Min                     Max 
Car 1 0.0986542   0.1701561   -0.0774148   0.3532671 
Car 2       0.0825682   0.1975507   -0.0724781   0.4477721 
Car 3 0.0943907   0.2157216   -0.0724667   0.4496380 
Car 4 0.1128411   0.2714822   -0.0609575   0.6142525 
Car 5   0.1263310   0.3102446   -0.0726088   0.7603781 
Car 6  0.1004079   0.2814196   -0.0805649   0.7101556 
Car 7 0.0736834   0.3047707   -0.2464669   0.6741769   
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Table IX: 
 
Overall performance of SPACs during the 2003-2009 period 
 
Panel A: Buy and hold returns for companies that completed merger: 
 
Variable                                           Number           Mean          Std. Deviation     Minimum       Maximum 
Unit Offer Price            66 7.33      7.33      6.00     10.10 
Warrants Per Unit           66 1.46      0.50      1.00      2.00 
Warrant exerc. price        66    5.48      0.74      5.00      8.00 
Gross proceeds in mill      66 98875.63      106313.11       7878.00      528000.00 
Original Unit offer price           66 7.7 1.54 6.00 10.10 
Percentage in escrow        66 0.93      0.05      0.85      1.00 
StockPrice 06_23_2009       66 2.94      2.42 0.00 8.34 
Unit price 06_23_2009       66 4.84 5.55 0.00 25.02 
WarrantPrice 06_03_2009     66 0.19      0.45 0.00 2.75 
Return on Unit (buy and hold) 66 -0.28 0.91 -1.00 3.17 
 
 
Panel B:  Characteristics and buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that announced a merger 
 
 
Variable                                          Number             Mean        Std. Deviation    Minimum         Maximum 
Unit Offer Price            16 8.50 1.36 6.00 10.00 
Warrants Per Unit           16 1.12 0.34 1.00 2.00 
Warrant exerc. price        16 6.04 1.10 4.50 7.50 
Gross proceeds in mill      16 177.09 162.14    27.98   552.00 
Percentage in escrow        16 0.98 0.01 0.94 1.03 
StockPrice 06_23_2009       16 8.10 1.42 5.55 9.79 
Unit price 06_23_2009       16 9.37 3.49 5.80 20.28 
WarrantPrice 06_03_2009     16 0.27 0.22 0.01 0.65 
Return on Unit (buy and hold) 16 0.09 0.32 -0.10 1.02 
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Panel C: Characteristics and buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that did not announce a merger 
 
 
 
           Variable                                Number        Mean          Std. Deviation        Minimum        Maximum 
Unit Offer Price            23 9.21 0.99 8.00 10.00 
Warrants Per Unit           23 0.97 0.10 0.50 1.00 
Warrant exerc. price        23 6.44 1.01 5.00 7.50 
Gross proceeds in mill      23 293.65 286.91 33.91 103.50 
Percentage in escrow        23 0.98 0.01 0.96 1.00 
StockPrice 06_23_2009       23 8.83 0.98 7.25 9.77 
Unit price 06_23_2009       23 8.59 2.12 0.00 10.00 
WarrantPrice 06_03_2009     23 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.40 
Return on Unit (buy and hold) 23 -0.082 0.20 -1.00 100 
 
Panel D:  Characteristics of companies that liquidated 
 
                                      
        Variable                                    Number        Mean           Std. Deviation    Minimum         Maximum 
Unit Offer Price            49 7.76 1.51 6.00 10.10 
Warrants Per Unit           49 1.40 0.49 1.00 2.00 
Warrant exerc. price        49 5.76 0.95 4.50 8.00 
Gross proceeds in mill      49 105.27 79.35 18.97 414.00 
Percentage in escrow        49 0.96 0.03 0.85 1.00 
 
 
Panel E:  Characteristics of SPAC samples with available info at IPO date 
 
         Variable                                     Number        Mean          Std. Deviation    Minimum        Maximum 
Unit Offer Price            156 7.85 1.53 6.00 10.10 
Warrants Per Unit           156 1.34 0.48 0.50 2.00 
Warrant exerc. price        156 5.76 0.94 4.50 8.00 
Gross proceeds in mill      156 137.65 160.20 7.87 1035.00 
Percentage in escrow        0.957 0.04 0.85 1.03 1.00 
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Table X: 
 
Merger determinants 
 
Probit estimation results are obtained when hypothesis that Merger=f(set of SPAC characteristics) is tested. 
Here UNDN=number of underwriters in IPO syndicate. EBCAP=EarlyBirdCapital , CITI=Citigroup, 
Maxim= Maxim group, Gun Allen = Gun Allen  
 
Panel A:  Merger outcomes 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Parameter                                         DF             Std.Estim             Wald.er          Chi-sq        Pr>Chi-sq 
Intercept      1 10.57 3.61 8.48 0.03 
Unit  Price  1 0.28 0.14 3.55 0.05 
Warrant Price  1 0.45 0.39 1.31 0.25 
Gross proceeds  1 -13.78 3.76 13.4 0.00 
UNDN    1 -0.06 0.07 0.81 0.36 
EBCAP 1 0.10 0.07 2.06 0.15 
CITI 1 -0.02 0.02 1.20 0.27 
Maxim 1 -0.10 0.08 1.64 0.19 
GunAllen 1 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.64 
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Table I: Q&A The description of SPACs  
SPAC description and main characteristics: 
Questions 
                     Answers 
What is a SPAC? SPAC stands for Specified Purpose Acquisition 
Company. 
Does this means it is a company with a special 
purpose? 
Yes. SPACs are formed specifically to acquire or 
merge with an unknown company over a limited 
period of time. 
How long is that time period?  When SPACs first started it was 18 months after their 
IPO; then it was 24 months, and most recently it is 36 
months.  
But why do SPACs go public through an IPO? Mainly because SPAC founders, besides past 
executive experience and conviction to have a 
“vision”, before IPO have $0 in assets, as well in 
equity. Someone has to come up with funds for future 
merger. 
Who are the founders of SPACs? Executives with expertise in industries in which they 
are seeking potential targets form mergers. Recently 
hedge funds, investment funds and private equity also 
became involved. 
How much capital do SPAC founders bring in 
initially? 
It is more a “change” than capital. On average they 
bring in $57.000, while majority bring only $25.000 
in total, and with that money they  buy 4.16 millions 
of shares, paying them $0.013 each. 
Is then the rest of the SPAC’s capital raised through 
an IPO? 
Yes. Public investors buying ownership of SPACs, 
provide close to 100% of capital. 
What is the ownership percentage of public investors 
in SPACs, as providers of almost 100% of capital,? 
Public investors own 80% of the shares of the SPAC; 
the remaining 20% stays with SPAC founders. 
Are SPACs identified by a different name? The  SEC classifies them as “blank check companies” 
under SIC Code 6770, and the public terms them that 
way very often, but SPACs differ from original blank 
checks in many significant ways. 
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Table II 
Journey from formation to IPO  
Questions, steps Answers, description 
What is the S-1 form? The registration statement form filed with the SEC to 
issue shares in public offerings. This applies to the 
majority of companies, but not to “penny stocks” or 
typical pre-SPAC “blank check companies.” All 
SPACs use this form. 
Who prepares S-1 form? Founders of the SPAC, their legal advisers, and 
underwriters work together on the form. 
What is disclosed in the S-1 form of a typical SPAC? The S-1 form discloses all of the relevant information 
in a SPAC’s life from IPO to merger. It presents a 
prospectus summary, financial data summary, 
description of risk factors, underwriting agreement, 
legal matters, use of proceeds, dilution, proposed 
business, dividend policy, management, and a 
description of securities, etc. 
What are the securities  issued by the SPACs? SPACs raise funds in primary markets primarily by 
selling units. They also sometimes register to issue 
preferred shares. 
What is a Unit? A unit is a security that consists of one share of 
common stock and one or two warrants to purchase 
one more common stock at a discounted price. 
Are the Units tradable, and if yes, where? Yes. As opposed to blank check companies that 
comply with rule 419-a, SPAC units, shares and 
warrants start trading soon after the IPO. At first, 
they were traded on OTC, then AMEX listed them. 
Recently, NASDAQ and NYSE listed  SPACs . 
Can warrants be exercised anytime? Not really. They are usually exercisable later in the 
business transaction or one year from the date of the 
completed S-1 form. 
What is an escrow account? In order to assure public investors that their funds 
will be used for a unique purpose, SPAC founders 
establish an escrow account and freeze 95% of funds 
raised during the IPO in the account, until the point 
of merger or liquidation. 
What is the role of underwriters in the SPAC IPO? The role of underwriters is probably more important 
than many people  realize. They primarily invented 
the new SPAC structure.  
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Table III 
From IPO to merger  
After- IPO events,  
Questions 
Description &Answers 
What happens once an IPO is done? First, underwriters inform SPAC managers that unit 
trading  can begin. Soon after that they report on the 
trading of shares and warrants. 
What is the next step? The investors freely trade their units, shares and 
warrants while managers seek the target for the 
merger combination through different sources  
Where can they look for the target?  SPAC managers are free to look for a business 
merger in any industry, but mostly they rely on their 
specific knowledge and focus on industries or 
countries in which they have an edge. 
What happens once they find a target? At the moment they negotiate a potential deal with 
the target, they make an announcement and inform 
the investors. 
Is the previous step the only thing required prior to  
the merger? 
No. After the announcement the most difficulty 
challenges begin. First, the majority of investors must 
be convinced that the deal is going to create  value 
for them. Second, all information about the deal must 
be checked by the SEC and after the approval mailed 
to investors.   
What percentage of shareholder are necessary to vote 
for the deal to be approved?    
It depends. It is on a case by case basis. At first the 
SPAC managers need 80% of all shares to support 
the deal including their own 20%. Today, they need 
60% in total, and in some cases even 55%.  
What if they have lower support than that? They cannot go further with the deal. They must 
dissolve the SPAC and return the majority of the 
investments to the shareholders. 
Does this happen frequently? In our sample, out of 161 SPACS that conducted an 
IPO, 49 of them were liquidated or announced 
liquidation, while 71 successfully merged.. This  ratio 
equals 1:1.44 . 
Once a SPAC merges, what happens next? The new corporation  often changes its name,  and 
continues as a new corporate entity, either in the US 
or elsewhere 
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